HOW ISRAEL COMPARES:
CONFLICTS AROUND THE WORLD

Dr. Shale Horowitz


CHAI MITZVAH
Grow Your Judaism

HOW ISRAEL COMPARES:
CONFLICTS AROUND THE WORLD

Dr. Shale Horowitz

Chai Mitzvah was created as a way to engage adults, teens, and families in a Jewish journey throughout their lives. Combining texts to spark discussion, ritual, and social action, Chai Mitzvah provides the framework for a meaningful Jewish journey.

This project aims to inform our community and its supporters about the lethal double standards used against Israel. We hope that this knowledge will empower us to fight back against those who seek to destroy us – in our time (2023) as in the past.

www.chaimitzvah.org

1 Israel Compares Favorably
2 States' Goals, Methods, & Threat Levels
3 Israel and Her Enemies
4 Turkey and Her Enemies
5 Focused Comparison of Israel & Turkey
6 Map: Ethno-Territorial Conflicts
7 China and Russia
8 The Near East
9 South Asia
10 Southeast Asia
11 Some African Examples
12 Some European Examples
13 Border Wars
14 Wars of Continued Independence
15 Conclusions

HOW ISRAEL COMPARES:
Conflicts around the World

CONTENTS

SECTION 1: ISRAEL COMPARES FAVORABLY TO THE DOZENS OF OTHER STATES INVOLVED IN SIMILAR CONFLICTS

Israel is singled out from among all countries in the world for the most intense criticism — whether by governments at the _United Nations_, or by the Palestinian-led, international Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (_BDS_) movement, or even by _many mainstream Western media outlets_.

Is this criticism fair? To see, Israel must be compared to other states embroiled in similar conflicts and wars.

Conflicts that are both ethnic and territorial are a regular feature of the modern world, stretching across Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Relative to other states, Israel's goals and methods are among the most moderate, even though Israel has faced by far the greatest, most existential threats.

When consistent comparisons are made, Israel is no worse, and is almost always much better, than these other countries.

The double-standard in Israel's treatment is a particularly lethal form of anti-semitism, in which those unfairly criticizing Israel participate in the ongoing, genocidal campaign to destroy Israel and to kill and expel her Jewish population.

> The most widely accepted _definition of anti-semitism_ — that of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) — includes the following categories:
> "Applying double standards by requiring of [Israel] a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation."
> "Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor."

Knowing the Enemy

Those who criticize Israel unfairly as compared to other democracies — in practice, often singling Israel out for uniquely harsh and hostile condemnation — are anti-semites according to the IHRA definition.

But Israel's enemies are much worse than mere anti-semites: The extreme double-standards are driven, not just by a denial of Israel's right to exist, but by a continuing, dangerous effort to destroy Israel and kill or expel her population.

No other state in the world is threatened in this way. This is the modern-day parallel to the long historical record of Jew-hatred, in which Jews have been persecuted more harshly than any other people.

Knowing this can make us stronger — giving us the knowledge, perspective, and courage to defend Israel and the Jewish people and fight back against their enemies.

Fighting Back

The international campaign to unfairly vilify Israel is part of the larger campaign to destroy her. It seeks to impose sanctions to undermine Israel's economy and military defense capacity.

Those who support this effort must be stigmatized, not just as anti-semites, but as supporters of a genocidal effort to destroy Israel and to kill and expel her Jewish population.

All who support Israel's right to exist, and to be treated fairly in her struggle for survival, should get involved — by learning more, by educating their family and friends, and by supporting and joining like-minded people in the many outstanding organizations working for the cause.

SECTION 2: ETHNIC AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS: Comparing Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

Israel's conflicts are ethno-territorial — ethnic and territorial at the same time. What are ethno-territorial wars?

Ethno-territorial war: A state fights internal or external enemies over control of territory that each side views as part of its distinct ethnic homeland.

Internal type: States possessing the disputed territory fight internal rebels claiming to represent their ethnic group in the disputed territory.

International type: States possessing the disputed territory fight other states over the disputed homeland territory.

How do we compare the combatants' behavior in such conflicts?

Each side must choose its goals and methods, while taking into account the enemy's goals, methods, and threat level.

Goals and methods can be compared for relative moderation or extremism. Threat levels vary in terms of the risks and consequences of military defeat. Thus, Israel's goals, methods, and threat levels can be compared to those of other states involved in ethno-territorial wars.

We will focus on the more common, internal type of ethno-territorial war, but will also examine the less common, international type.

Goals

Goals are defined by the moderation or extremism of ideal goals and the willingness to moderate or compromise such ideals. Moderation is motivated both by a desire to minimize war costs and downside risks of war for one's own people and to abide by norms of respect for the enemy.

Range of state goals, from most moderate to most extreme: State goals in ethno-territorial conflict range from the most moderate, such as being willing to grant independence to ethnic rebels (or cede territory to rival states) or grant the ethnic rebel group local political autonomy, to the more common one of retaining control over the disputed territory while extending equal treatment to the rebel ethnic group, to the most extreme, such as discriminating against or trying to forcibly assimilate the rebel ethnic group or even partially or wholly driving the rebel ethnic group from the disputed territory via mass killings and expulsions.

Goals of States Fighting Internal Rebels or Enemy States

MORE MODERATE				MORE EXTREME
Agree to Grant Ethnic Rebels or Enemy States Sovereignty over Large Share of Disputed Territories	Agree to Grant Rival Ethnic Group Political Autonomy within Existing State	Retain or Gain Control over Disputed Territories, while Treating Inhabitants Relatively Equally under Existing Political System	Retain or Gain Control over Disputed Territories, while Seeking to Eliminate Enemy Ethnic Group via Forced Assimilation	Retain or Gain Control over Disputed Territories, while Seeking to Eliminate Enemy Ethnic Group via Expulsion and Killing

Range of ethnic rebel goals, from most moderate to most extreme: Similarly, rebel goals in ethno-territorial conflict range from the more moderate, like equal treatment for one's ethnic kin population, to more far-reaching ones such as local political autonomy for one's ethnic kin or outright territorial secession, to the most extreme, in which the rebels attempt to forcibly assimilate the ethnic group associated with the state or even to partially or wholly drive the ethnic group from the disputed territory via mass killings and expulsions.

Goals of Internal Rebels Fighting Enemy States

MORE MODERATE				MORE EXTREME
Agree to Accept State Sovereignty over Disputed Territories, while Demanding only Equal Treatment	Agree to Accept State Sovereignty over Disputed Territories, while Demanding Political Autonomy within Existing State Territory	Demand Sovereignty over Large Share of Disputed Territories, while Treating All Inhabitants Relatively Equally	Demand Sovereignty over Large Share of Disputed Territories, while Seeking to Eliminate Enemy Ethnic Group via Forced Assimilation	Demand Sovereignty over Large Share of Disputed Territories, while Seeking to Eliminate Enemy Ethnic Group via Expulsion and Killing

Methods

Range of methods used by states and rebels, from most moderate to most extreme: Enemy combatants are attacked with some combination of conventional or guerrilla warfare. Greater or lesser efforts may be made to minimize civilian casualties while attacking enemy combatants. When such efforts are made, they may be more or less effective.

Methods often extend to targeting the enemy's civilian supporters. When enemy civilians are targeted to deter them from supporting the enemy, the most moderate approach is to try to target only those known to be supporting the enemy, while leaving alone those who remain neutral and rewarding those supportive of the state. More extreme methods target enemy group civilians indiscriminately, in an effort to terrorize both actual and potential supporters into withholding support from the rebels. (The terms "terror" and "terrorism" refer to intentional killings of civilians.)

When efforts are made to solidify long-term control over disputed territory, a more moderate method facilitates in-migration of own-group civilians into contested areas. More extreme methods begin with attempts to forcibly assimilate the enemy population and sometimes go even further to include mass expulsions and killings.

Methods of Defeating Enemy Combatants: How Civilians are Treated

MORE MODERATE		MORE EXTREME
Discriminating Attacks on Enemy Combatants Try to Minimize Civilian Casualties, with Higher Effectiveness	Discriminating Attacks on Enemy Combatants Try to Minimize Civilian Casualties, with Lower Effectiveness	Indiscriminate Attacks on Enemy Combatants Do Not Try to Minimize Civilian Casualties
Civilians Are Not Intentionally Targeted to Prevent Them from Supporting the Enemy	Civilians Are Intentionally Targeted to Prevent Them from Supporting the Enemy, in a Discriminating Way that Tries to Identify Supporters	Civilians Are Intentionally Targeted to Prevent Them from Supporting the Enemy, in an Indiscriminate Way that Tries to Terrorize Actual or Potential Supporters

Methods of Solidifying Claims to Disputed Territories

MORE MODERATE			MORE EXTREME
Own-Group Civilians Are Encouraged to Migrate to Disputed Territories	Enemy-Group Civilians in Disputed Territories Are Forcibly Assimilated	Enemy-Group Civilians in Disputed Territories Are Forcibly Expelled	Enemy-Group Civilians in Disputed Territories Are Targeted for Mass Killing

Threat Levels

Enemy threat levels, from most limited to most far-reaching: The more militarily powerful the enemy and the more extreme the enemy goals and methods, the greater is the threat level. Combatants facing higher threat levels will be less likely to compromise their goals or limit their methods where this would predictably strengthen the enemy.

Most famously, during World War II, Britain and the U.S. demanded unconditional surrender and indiscriminately bombed German and Japanese cities because of Germany and Japan's unlimited goals, unrestrained methods, and most importantly, their great military power and high threat levels.

Threat Levels Faced by States

MORE MODERATE				MORE EXTREME
May Have to Accept Ethnic Group Political Autonomy on Some State Territory	May Have to Accept Loss of Some State Territory to Seceding Ethnic Group or to Neighboring State	Face Loss of Independence (Absorption into Another State or Satellite Status)	Face Loss of Independence and Major Ethnic Group's Forced Assimilation	Face Loss of Independence and Major Ethnic Group's Elimination Via Killing and Expulsion

Threat Levels Faced by Ethnic Minorities

MORE MODERATE						MORE EXTREME
Offered Statehood in Area Falling Short of Claimed Homeland	Offered a Significant Level of Local Political Autonomy, without Statehood	Offered Only Equal Treatment, with Varying Imperfections Due to Nature of Existing Regime	Face Strongly Unequal Treatment by State	Face Loss of Majority Status in Traditional Areas of Settlement	Face State-Led Forced Assimilation	Face Elimination Via Killing and Expulsion

Looking Ahead

We begin by looking at goals, methods, and threat levels in Israel's conflicts.

We first compare Israel's conflicts to Turkey's, because Turkey is the closest neighbor with a similar range of conflicts.

We then broaden the comparison to ask how Israel compares to the many other states embroiled in major ethno-territorial conflicts.

SECTION 3: ISRAEL COMPARED TO HER ENEMIES

There is a remarkable asymmetry between Israel's goals, methods, and threat levels and those of her enemies. In the extensive annals of ethno-territorial conflict in the modern world, it is difficult to find a single example of a state that, like Israel, has had such moderate goals and methods and high threat levels, while facing enemies with such extreme goals and methods and low threat levels.

Israel: Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

Israel has always sought coexistence, both with the surrounding Arab states and with her internal Arab population. Israel has sought national self-determination in the Jews' historic homeland — there being no other actual or potential Jewish homeland. But Israel's leaders, facing geopolitical and demographic constraints and self-imposed normative restrictions, have always been willing to compromise their territorial goals. This has been shown repeatedly, from the time of the 1937 Peel Commission, through the 1947 UN Partition Plan, and many more times since — particularly during the roughly three decades since the 1993 Oslo Peace Process, in which Israel established a self-ruling Palestinian Arab proto-state in the West Bank and Gaza and repeatedly sought to negotiate final peace agreements with its leaders. Israeli peace offers have included a Palestinian state in all of Gaza and in over 90 percent of the West Bank.[1]

Turning to methods, Israel has shown unusual restraint in limiting attacks on civilians — though this restraint, as in all other conflicts, has not been perfect. Before and during the 1948 War, smaller Jewish political organizations — the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) and especially the Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi) — sometimes sought to deter Arab attacks on Jewish civilians with retaliatory attacks on Arab civilians.[2] In the 1948 War, most Palestinian refugees fled actual or anticipated fighting, or left voluntarily following Israeli military victories — often at the urging of Arab authorities. Others were expelled for military reasons by Arab forces. Israel forcibly expelled Arab populations only in the two towns of Lydda and Ramle and in a number of villages.[3] These expulsions occurred on an ad hoc basis in a defensive war of survival — where Arab towns and villages controlled vital lines of communication and important geographical positions, and where Israel's still-small military lacked the manpower to maintain large numbers of garrisons where local Arab fighters were embedded within civilian populations. They were last resorts when efforts to negotiate peaceful coexistence at the local level failed, and when Israel was struggling to consolidate minimally defensible borders. They were not — as Israel's enemies have alleged — part of a premeditated, large-scale strategic plan.[4] After the 1948 War, a sizeable Arab population remained, growing since then to around 20 percent of Israel's population.[5]

In seeking to secure control over disputed territories considered vital, Israel has almost always used the method of encouraging settlement of its own civilians, rather than expelling Arab populations. This was the traditional policy before the Jewish state's founding and continued after 1948 in peripheral regions like the Galilee and the Negev. Since gaining control over the West Bank and Gaza after the 1967 War, Israel's settlement policies have sought a middle ground. Expanded settlements are a more normatively acceptable substitute for forced expulsions. They allow Israel to more securely control areas viewed as crucial to Israel's

national identity and security — such as Jerusalem and selected strategic points on its periphery — in any future peace agreement. On the other hand, by leaving large Arab populations in place, they preserve significant vulnerabilities. Since 1993, these vulnerabilities have led Israeli governments to retreat from the more far-reaching settlement ambitions pursued by Likud governments during the 1970s and 1980s.[6]

Israel's efforts to deter the recurring waves of low-intensity warfare on her borders have often been criticized as excessive and disproportionate, but no other country has been subjected to such constant, disruptive attacks, and no other country has shown greater restraint in response to similar, but more limited attacks.[7] For example, when facing enemies that attack Israeli civilians while intentionally sheltering among Arab civilians, Israel has used both intelligence and technology to minimize civilian casualties in a way that is more elaborate and sophisticated than other states in similar types of conflict.

The relative power of Israel's enemies has fluctuated significantly, generally declining over time. Yet their far-reaching goals and Israel's small size have given rise to an ever-changing array of strategic threats, which have left little margin for error. Israel's existence has been repeatedly threatened, even after she appeared to establish lasting conventional military superiority in 1967.

The 1973 War showed the potential for conventional military surprises. Egypt's newly acquired Soviet military technology nearly produced a military victory, and Soviet support for a protracted war would have exhausted Israel's military supplies without an offsetting U.S. effort.[8] New and non-conventional methods and technologies have repeatedly threatened to impose huge costs and undermine living conditions in Israel. Examples include the cross-border shelling and terror attacks from Egypt and Syria before 1967 and Jordan before 1970; the rocket and missile wars waged from Lebanon since the late 1960s by the PLO and more recently Hezbollah; the PLO's suicide bombing war of 2000; the Hamas rocket, missile, and infiltration war waged from Gaza since 2005; and, most dangerous of all, the nuclear-weapons threats from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the Assads' Syria, Khomeinist Iran, and in the future, maybe Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey.

Such threats impose significant limits on what compromises in ends and means Israel may safely make. Yet Israel has repeatedly tried to end the conflict by offering and making risky concessions. These were both offered in negotiations, as with Egypt over the Sinai, with Syria over the Golan Heights, and with the PLO over the West Bank and Gaza; and made unilaterally, as with the 2000 withdrawal from Southern Lebanon and the 2005 disengagement from Gaza.

Israel's Enemies: Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

How do Israel's enemies compare? Israel's enemies have been varied and changing, including Palestinian Arabs, neighboring and regional Arab states, and more recently, the two major non-Arab regional powers, Iran and Turkey. Ideologically, her more radical enemies did not seek merely an Arab state or Arab rule in part of British Mandate Palestine—to be added to the Arab states stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. They have always denied Israel's right to exist, seeking at first to stop her creation and later to destroy her. This destruction was to be not just political, but also demographic — to include killing and expelling the Jewish

population. These enemies include all of the major Palestinian leaderships, from Haj Amin al-Husseini in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, to successive Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas leaders. Over time, a number of more moderate enemies have come to tolerate Israel's existence for practical reasons — due to rival internal and regional priorities and to Israel's growing strength.

Israel's enemies have used all available means in their efforts to destroy her. Only in the 1948 War did Arab armies manage to overrun Jewish-populated areas. In every case, all Jews were expelled.[9] During lulls before and after conventional wars, going all the way back to 1920, a low-intensity war has been fought against Israel on a shifting series of fronts, using a variety of methods. Civilians have always been targeted for killing or expulsion, with the main restraint being the deterrent imposed by Israel's retaliatory capability.[10] These actions have always made clear the fate of Israel's population should she lose any war.

Although Israel's relative military power has risen significantly over time, she has posed only a limited retaliatory threat to her enemies. Israel never sought to conquer and destroy surrounding Arab states. Moreover, Israel's moderation and sensitivity to great-power pressure have given her enemies significant latitude to launch conventional and unconventional attacks without fear of catastrophic downside risks and losses. External great-power pressure saved Arab armies from destruction in the 1948 and 1973 Wars, prevented losses of Arab-held territory in 1948 and 1956, and yielded Arab territorial gains in 1973.[11] The 1967 War, in which Israel gained control over the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, was an exception to this rule, but the outcome precisely defied expectations based on previous conflicts. Between wars, Israel responded to low-intensity attacks with retaliation seeking to deter further attacks.[12] This retaliation has been limited not only by the absence of far-reaching goals beyond deterrence, but also by normative constraints that sought to minimize enemy civilian casualties and by a desire to avoid escalation toward larger wars. This restraint has in turn weakened deterrence, often leading to more sustained low-intensity attacks and higher Israeli civilian and military casualties.

What would Israel's enemies have done had they been in Israel's position? At the end of the 1948 War, they would not have allowed any significant Arab-Muslim populations to remain within Israel's borders. And those borders would almost certainly have been expanded, at a minimum, to encompass all of Mandate Palestine, if not in 1949, then in 1967 or earlier. Any low-intensity warfare would have been met by scorched-earth retaliation on a massive scale.

ISRAEL AND HER ENEMIES: COMPARISON AND SUMMARY

Israel and Her Enemies: Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Israel	Palestinian Arabs, Arab States, Iran and Hezbollah, Turkey
Goals	• Coexistence and equality with Arab states, including repeated willingness before and after 1948 to accept a Palestinian Arab state as part of a peace agreement • Equality of Israeli Arab citizens	• Israel's political destruction • Killing and expulsion of Israel's Jewish population • Over time, six of 21 Arab states have signed peace agreements recognizing Israel's right to exist
Methods	• Conventional military responses to conventional attacks and threats • Discriminating responses to low-intensity guerrilla and terror attacks • Exceptions: Before 1948, some retaliatory terror attacks by smaller Lehi and Irgun groups; during the 1948 war, forced expulsions of Palestinian Arabs from two towns and a number of villages • After 1967, sponsored Jewish settlement, concentrated on Jerusalem's periphery, beyond the 1949 cease-fire lines • In 1993-7, as part of the Oslo Process, Israel turned over government of almost all of Gaza and the major West Bank population centers to the PLO-controlled Palestinian Authority • In 2005, unilaterally withdrew from all of Gaza and a small number of West Bank settlements, to separate territories until such time as Palestinian Arab leaders become willing to negotiate a peace agreement	• Initiated or threatened multiple conventional wars of annihilation against Israel • Maintained nearly constant low-intensity guerrilla and terror attacks over the entire century of conflict; like their predecessor Amin Husseini, both the PLO and Hamas have used force against Palestinian Arab moderates and each other to attempt to impose political monopolies • When Jewish-populated areas were overrun, in the 1948 war, or 2023, civilians were killed or expelled • Where the capability existed, low-intensity terror attacks regularly escalated to large-scale bombardment of civilian population centers • Persecution led almost all Jews to flee from Arab countries, mostly to Israel • A number of enemies have sought nuclear weapons, while calling for Israel's destruction — Arab states in the past and Iran in the present
Threat Level	• Faced repeated, nearly constant threats that the Jewish state would be annihilated and its Jewish population killed and expelled, whether by conventional invasion, large-scale bombardment of civilian population centers, or nuclear weapons	• Faced retaliatory military and border territory losses • Losses were limited by Israel's self-imposed norms and great-power support for Israel's enemies • Almost all territories lost in 1967 could have been regained by agreeing to Israel's land-for-peace offers • Before 1967, the West Bank and Gaza were controlled by Jordan and Egypt • Since 1993, one de facto Palestinian state was formed with Israel's agreement; since 2007, a second one formed in Gaza; among the 21 Arab states, one, Jordan, also has a majority-Palestinian Arab population

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF GOALS, METHODS, AND THREAT LEVELS

Goals: Israel's pre-1948 leadership pursued statehood while accepting partition of British Mandate Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. After 1948, Israel's governments continued to seek such compromises. Israel has sought coexistence internationally with Arab states — including a potential Palestinian Arab state — alongside equal treatment of its Arab Muslim citizens.

Israel's enemies have not concentrated on seeking Palestinian Arab statehood, which they declined to implement in 1948-67, when Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt controlled Gaza. They have instead focused on destroying Israel and killing and expelling her Jewish population. War against the pre-state Jewish community began under the Palestinian Arab leadership of Amin Husseini after World War I and was joined by Arab states when Israel declared independence in 1948. Despite peace agreements with Egypt, Jordan, and four other, more peripheral Arab states, the war against Israel has been sustained by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, and joined by major non-Arab regional powers — Iran and, more recently, Turkey.

Methods: Israel has periodically faced conventional invasion seeking her annihilation. Going back to 1920, the pre-state Jewish community and then Israel have seen nearly constant low-intensity attacks, mostly on civilians, designed to kill as many Jews as possible and make conditions as unlivable as possible for the remainder.

Israel has almost always responded to conventional attacks and threats with conventional military responses, and to low-intensity attacks with discriminating low-intensity responses, designed to defeat and deter attackers. In the early period of greatest vulnerability, there were some reprisal attacks against Arab civilians by the smaller Irgun and Lehi paramilitaries, which were condemned and rejected by the central Jewish leadership; and in the 1948 war, Arab civilians were expelled from two strategic towns (Lod and Ramleh) and a number of villages. Most Arab refugees from the 1948 war were not expelled but fled—as is common in all ethno-territorial wars where fighting occurs in areas of mixed ethnic settlement. Again, Israel offered its Arab citizens equal treatment. In 1947-8, local Jewish leaders often called for local Arabs to remain in place as equal citizens.

Over the century-long conflict, Israel has gone to great lengths to minimize civilian casualties — typically making equal or greater efforts to do so compared to other democracies in similar conflicts. For example, when facing enemies that attack Israeli civilians while intentionally sheltering among Arab civilians, Israel has used both intelligence and technology to minimize civilian casualties in a way that is more elaborate and sophisticated than other states in similar types of conflict. This continued to be true in 2023, following the Hamas massacre of over 1000 Israelis.

Threat levels: The great numbers, resources, and hostility of Israel's enemies have created a constant threat to her existence and the survival of her Jewish population. This threat evolved from deadly attacks by Palestinian Arab irregulars before 1948; to a combination of conventional, guerrilla, and terror attacks and threats in the following decades, including major wars in 1947-8, 1956, 1967, and 1973; to ongoing guerrilla and terror attacks from 1973 to the present day — most recently emanating primarily from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. These non-conventional attacks have often assumed proportions that threatened civilian life over large areas. Hezbollah currently possesses over 125,000 missiles, with many able to strike Israel's main population centers. Hamas also has a huge missile arsenal. There have also been a succession of nuclear threats, beginning with Iraq, and later involving Syria and, most dangerously of all, Iran.

By contrast, Israel has not threatened the existence of any neighboring states, and her deterrence efforts have been significantly constrained by ethical self-restraint and by great power pressure to limit even military losses to Arab states. Such great-power pressure, for example, saved Arab armies from destruction in 1948 and 1973, and led to significant Israeli withdrawals in 1956 and 1973. Only in 1967 was Israel able to make major advances, which enabled her to offer to trade land for peace from a position of greater security. Overall, Israel's self-restraint and great-power pressure have further incentivized her enemies to attack more often and more dangerously.

[1]Martin Gilbert, *The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 22, 36, 115, 135, 148, 150-1, 155, 170, 180-2; Efraim Karsh, *Arafat's War* (New York: Grove, 2003), pp. 57, 136, 139, 151-2, 160-1, 168; Efraim Karsh, *Palestine Betrayed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 256-7; Benny Morris, 1948 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 19, 396.

[2]Gilbert, op cit., pp. 24-5; Karsh 2010, op cit., p. 113; Morris 2008, op. cit., p. 100.

[3]Karsh 2010, op. cit., pp. 123, 125, 134-7, 140-2, 147, 152, 158-9, 164-5, 171, 215-6, 219-21; Morris 2008, op. cit., pp. 93-7, 100, 126, 130, 136, 139, 143-7, 152-4, 157-61, 166, 171-2, 277, 281-3, 290-4, 298, 328-34, 345-7.

[4]Karsh 2010, op. cit., pp. 102, 118-20, 161, 176-89, 211-2, 216, 219, 222-3, 235-43; Morris 2008, op. cit., pp.98-9, 106-7, 109, 113-21, 407-8, 410-1.

[5]Karsh 2010, op. cit., p. 250; Morris 2008, op. cit., p. 408.

[6]Karsh 2003, op. cit., pp. 54-7, 108-10, 122-39, 151-2, 156-70, 205-12.

[7]To take a recent example, the High-Level Military Group (*An Assessment of the 2014 Gaza Conflict*, p. 70), a team of high-ranking military experts from Western democracies, concluded that Israel's war-fighting methods "met and in some respects exceeded the highest standards we set for our own nations' militaries."

[8]Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence to Lebanon* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984), pp. 229, 307-10, 322.

[9]Karsh, op. cit., p. 211; Morris, op. cit., pp. 397, 409.

[10]Gilbert, op cit., pp. 10-1, 13, 17-21, 24-5, 52, 56, 58, 63-4, 71-2, 75-9, 99-100, 107, 114, 127, 147, 152-3, 162-3, 165-6; High-Level Military Group, *An Assessment of the 2014 Gaza Conflict*, pp. 7-9.

[11]Morris, op. cit., pp. 327, 329, 351, 365-71, 403-4; Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 62, 98; Herzog, op. cit, pp. 82, 94, 97, 101-4, 138-40, 166, 180, 278-9, 283-4, 299, 321-2.

[12]Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 59, 73, 77, 81, 100, 124, 154, 164-5, 167.

SECTION 4: TURKEY AND HER ENEMIES:
Armenians, Anatolian Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and Kurds

To gain perspective on Israel's conflicts, it is useful to make a detailed comparison to Turkey's conflicts — Turkey being the most important nearby state with a similar array of conflicts. Following the Ottoman Empire's collapse, Turkey fought a war of independence against external powers and internal threats; and Turkey later fought an international ethno-territorial war in Cyprus and an internal and international one in its own Kurdish regions and in Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria. In these conflicts, how do Turkey's goals, methods, and threat levels compare with those of its enemies? And how do Turkey's conflicts compare with Israel's?

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire, despite being an aggressor, was soon invaded by Russian and British forces. After the Axis defeat and the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the nascent Turkish state was faced with British, French, and Italian occupations of important border regions and a Greek invasion. Throughout this period, there was potential for large territorial losses in Western and Eastern Turkey. Yet there was no realistic chance that Turks would be left completely stateless, or that Turks would face a genocide or general expulsion. Had Armenians, Greeks or Kurds managed to gain sovereign territories in peripheral parts of Anatolia, there might have been partial or even complete forced expulsions of Turks from one or more of those regions.

How did the Ottomans and, later, the Turks under Mustafa Kemal, respond to these threats? Most infamously, with the Armenian Genocide — in which almost the entire Armenian community was forced onto death marches to nowhere, punctuated by repeated massacres. The surviving remnants were forced to flee to Russian-controlled Armenia, the Arab Middle East, and beyond. When Armenian survivors returned to parts of Anatolia after the war, they were comprehensively driven out.[13] A similar destruction befell the Assyrian Christian minority, which was dispersed and unorganized, and therefore posed no territorial threat.[14] A large proportion of Greeks too were put through death marches and massacres, although most were allowed to flee to Greece.[15] All told, Ottoman and Kemalist killings and forced expulsions obliterated Turkey's Christian ethnic populations, which fell from around 20 percent of the population in 1914 to two percent in 1924.[16]

At independence in 1960, Greek Cypriots were about 82 percent of the population and Turkish Cypriots about 18 percent. Britain arranged a constitution that gave Turkish as well as Greek Cypriots a veto over important legislation, while giving Greece and Turkey guarantor rights. Greek Cypriots afterwards pushed for a more democratic constitution, in which they would enjoy majority rule. But they never threatened to massacre or expel the Turkish Cypriots.[17] In 1974, Greece's ruling junta supported a coup in Cyprus to unify it with Greece. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus, conquering the northern 36 percent of the island, and forcibly expelling the north's entire Greek population. Since then, settlers from Turkey have more than doubled the original Turkish Cypriot population.[18] Turkey's bargaining position has been either that the Turkish-controlled zone be recognized as an independent state; or that any "reunification" of Cyprus must preserve the separate Turkish zone in the north as part of an equal, bizonal confederation, while also restoring Turkish veto rights over the central government.[19]

After Turkey's founding, Mustafa Kemal and his successors tried to forcibly assimilate the large Kurdish minority. Kurds were declared "Mountain Turks," and Kurdish language and culture were broadly repressed in education, the mass media, and day-to-day life. In the interwar period, Kurdish rebellions, which usually sought some level of political self-determination, were met with limited, regional versions of the methods used against the Anatolian Christians — forced expulsions and massacres.[20]

The conflict erupted again in 1984, when the Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, PKK) launched an internal and cross-border insurgency aimed at statehood in Turkey's Kurdish southeast. The PKK has been a brutal and uncompromising foe, and Turkey has reciprocated. In the Kurdish, heavily rural southeast, the PKK used terror to force Kurds to support its Maoist-style insurgency, which targeted Turkish security forces and state officials. Turkey responded with its own terror, which, during the late 1980s and 1990s, destroyed over 3500 Kurdish villages and expelled their residents to the cities.[21] Since PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's capture in 1999, lower-intensity PKK insurgency and terror and Turkish counterinsurgency and retaliatory terror have taken place alongside failed negotiations. The PKK feigns greater moderation without clearly giving up its traditional goal of independence; Turkey's Erdogan pretends to be interested in a negotiated peace, but refuses to make any significant concessions.[22] As the PKK and its affiliates have increased their presence across the border in Iraq and Syria, Turkish military operations have expanded into those countries. Counter-insurgency operations against the PKK are coupled with indiscriminate bombing and shelling. Since 2016, Turkey, in cooperation with Syrian Sunni jihadists, has seized large Syrian territories along its border and expelled the Kurdish population through indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings.[23] Within Turkey, repression of Kurdish language and culture has continued. In 2003, Erdogan changed the law to allow use of the Kurdish language in the mass media and non-school cultural activities. However, this made little difference in practice, as the Turkish state hounded Kurdish-language mass media and purged Kurdish cultural and political leaders.[24]

In 2009, after Israel entered Gaza to stop rocket attacks on Israeli cities, while making extraordinary efforts to limit civilian casualties, Turkey's President Erdogan lashed out at Israeli President Shimon Peres: "When it comes to killing, you [Israel] know well how to kill people…" Peres had asked, "What would any country do? What would you do if you would have in Istanbul every night 10 rockets, or 100 rockets?"[25] Erdogan has now shown what he would do. Faced during the Syrian civil war with a far more limited, less immediate threat from the PKK's Syrian affiliate, Erdogan used indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings to expel hundreds of thousands of Syrian Kurds from border regions of Syria. How many know or care?

Comparison of Turkey and Her Enemies:
Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Turkey	Armenians (1915-24), Greeks (1914-24), Greek Cypriots (1974), and Kurds (1984-Present)
Goals	• -Expel and kill nearly all Armenians; expel nearly all Anatolian Greeks • Conquer northern 36% of Cyprus and expel all Greek Cypriots from that part of the island • Force assimilation of Kurds	• Secession of Armenian-, Greek-, and Kurdish-settled regions from Turkish-ruled Anatolia • Possible expulsions of Turks from Greek-settled regions and of Turks and Kurds from Armenian-settled regions • Greek Cypriots: Majority rule by Greeks in Cyprus or union of Cyprus with Greece
Methods	• Armenians: Genocidal killings and forced expulsions of nearly the entire Armenian population • Anatolian Greeks: Killings and forced expulsions of Anatolian Greeks (and of dispersed, unthreatening Assyrian Christians) • Cyprus: Seized northern 36% of Cyprus and forcibly expelled its Greek Cypriot population • Kurds in Turkey: Forcibly expelled Kurds from thousands of villages; in addition to counter-insurgency, indiscriminate warfare and terror used against Kurdish civilians • Kurds in Syria and Iraq: Attacked Kurdish fighters; indiscriminate warfare, and especially since 2016 in Syria, terror and forced expulsions	• Greece's 1919 conventional invasion aimed to seize large regions of Anatolia, including some areas beyond those settled by Greeks; some forced expulsions of Turkish civilians, especially during conventional retreats; some civilian killings, but on a far smaller, less systematic scale than those of the Turks • Armenians and Kurds: Low-intensity guerrilla and terror attacks • Greek Cypriots: Overthrew Cyprus' government to bring about Greek majority rule via union with Greece; failed conventional defense against Turkish invasion
Threat Level	• Turkey: Threatened with loss of significant border territories — especially when, during and immediately after World War I, external states supported Armenian and Greek secessionist goals • Turkish Cypriots: The 18% Turkish Cypriot minority was threatened with loss of political veto power, having instead to live as equal citizens in a Greek-majority state, possibly integrated with Greece itself	• Anatolian Armenians and Greeks: Turkey comprehensively annihilated the Anatolian Armenians and expelled the Anatolian Greeks and Assyrian Christians • Cyprus: Before 1974 war, the Turkish Cypriot minority exercised a veto in Cypriot politics • Kurds: Turkey expelled a large share of the Kurdish population from rural areas of settlement, while implementing forced assimilation policies more broadly in education and culture; during the Syrian Civil War, Turkey conducted large-scale forced expulsions of Kurds in Syrian border regions

For sources, see above.

[13]Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities*, 1894-1924 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), pp. 248-55, 361-72.

[14]Morris and Ze'evi, *Thirty-Year Genocide*, pp. 373-80.

[15]Morris and Ze'evi, *Thirty-Year Genocide*, pp. 148-54, 215, 381, 397-8.

[16]Morris and Ze'evi, *Thirty-Year Genocide*, p.485

[17]Van Coufoudakis, *Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Modern Greek Studies, 2006), pp. 74-6.

[18]Coufoudakis, *Cyprus*, pp. 87-9.

[19]Coufoudakis, *Cyprus*, pp. 15-6, 78, 89; James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 58-61, 69-71, 73-8, 92.

[20]McDowall, Modern History, pp. 185-200, 206-10; James Ciment, *The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran* (New York: Facts on File, 1996), pp. 45, 47, 108.

[21]See McDowall, *Modern History*, pp. 420-6, 440-2. Ciment, *Kurds*, p. 157, gives the figures of 4000 villages destroyed and 1.5-2 million Kurds expelled by 1996, whereas McDowall, *Modern History*, pp. 440-1, has over 3500 villages and more than three million by 1999. Mustafa Cosar Unal, *Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Policy Effects Toward the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 60-6, notes that the Turkish government admitted "evacuating" 3165 villages by 1999, with the U.S. State Department estimating that 380,000 to one million were evacuated. The number formally evacuated is presumably lower than the number forcibly expelled.

[22]Unal, *Counterterrorism*, pp. 8-11, 121-9.

[23]Seth J. Frantzman, "Turkey Threatens New Ethnic-Cleansing Invasion of Syria – Analysis." *Jerusalem Post*, May 24, 2022.

[24]McDowall, *Modern History*, pp. 424, 427, 429; Paul White, *The PKK: Coming Down from the Mountains* (London: Zed, 2015), pp. 43, 51-4, 61; Unal, *Counterterrorism,* pp. 5-7, 78.

[25]Ron Synovitz, "Turkish PM Shows New Foreign Policy Assertiveness at Davos," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty*, January 30, 2009.

SECTION 5: A FOCUSED COMPARISON OF ISRAEL AND TURKEY: Israel's Goals and Methods Have Been Far More Moderate than Turkey's, Even Though Israel Has Faced Significantly More Catastrophic Threats

How do Turkey's conflicts compare to Israel's? Turkey has had more extreme goals, has used more extreme methods, and faces lesser threats than Israel, while Turkey's enemies have had more moderate goals, used less extreme or similar methods, and faced greater threats than Israel's enemies.

During World War I and in the follow-on war of independence, Turkey, to prevent the loss of large territories in Western and Eastern Anatolia, successfully destroyed — by killing and expulsion — its Christian ethnic minorities. In Israel's 1948 war of independence, Israel sought coexistence alongside Palestinian Arabs, making only limited, local use of forced expulsions in a defensive war of survival in which its enemies threatened to massacre and expel the entire Jewish population. As promised before 1948, Israel has extended equal citizenship to its large and rapidly growing Israeli Arab population.

When Turkish Cypriots faced the loss of their ethnic veto, along with a possible takeover by Greece, in 1974, Turkey conquered Northern Cyprus, expelled its entire Greek population, and settled large numbers from Turkey proper. Nor has Turkey offered to compromise these gains. Since 1984, Turkey faced a PKK insurgency and terror campaign aimed at taking Turkey's southeast for a Kurdish state. Turkey responded by expelling a large proportion of the rural Kurdish population, while continuing to deny Kurds even basic cultural freedoms. Forced expulsions have continued as Turkey has seized border regions of Syria. Turkish governments have not offered the Kurds even regional autonomy, let alone independence.

In 1967, Israel faced annihilation, but her military victory secured control over large new territories. Israel settled citizens in parts of Jerusalem and other strategic areas that it sought to control in the future, without displacing Palestinian Arab populations, and while remaining open to territorial compromise. Since 1967, Israel continued to face an array of potentially lethal conventional and unconventional threats and responded by making a series of far-reaching concessions to her major enemies. As part of the Oslo Peace Process, Israel allowed the PLO-controlled Palestinian Authority to set up its rule in Gaza and over the major West Bank Arab population centers, while repeatedly offering Palestinian Arab statehood in Gaza and over 90 percent of the West Bank in exchange for peace.

Israel vs. Turkey: An Anti-Semitic Double-Standard

Turkey's goals and methods have been far more extreme, despite a far lesser threat level, as compared to Israel's. Yet the only serious international criticism of Turkey is the Armenian-led campaign to get Turkey to recognize officially that the mass killing of most of its Armenian population constituted a genocide. No remedy beyond such words is even contemplated seriously. Regarding the travails of Greeks, Assyrian Christians, and Kurds, almost the entire world neither knows nor cares.

Israel alone faces a global campaign of defamation—from the UN General Assembly and Security Council to the Palestinian-led, global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement — that aims to impose economic sanctions and arms embargoes. This is part of the larger effort to destroy the Jewish state and kill and expel her Jewish population.

This comparison meets both major criteria of the IHRA definition of anti-semitism as it relates to Israel: Turkey has often been met standard definitions of democracy and, despite far more extreme behavior in goals and methods and far lower threat levels, is not subject to anything remotely like the criticism directed at Israel. The Turkish state is certainly not targeted for destruction. Nor is there an effort to kill and expel the Turkish people of Anatolia.

Comparing Israel and Turkey:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Israel	Turkey
Goals	• Israel has sought to coexist with neighboring Arab states, including a potential Palestinian Arab state, while extending equal treatment to her Arab Muslim citizens	• Turkey has aimed to eliminate her Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian Christian populations from mainland Turkey; to eliminate the Greek Cypriot population from disputed parts of Cyprus; and to forcibly assimilate the Kurdish population in Turkey
Methods	• Israel has sought to minimize civilian casualties in defending against conventional and guerrilla warfare and against terror attacks on its civilians • The main exceptions to this rule — incidents of pre-independence retaliatory attacks on Palestinian Arab civilians by the Lehi and Irgun organizations and forced expulsions of Palestinian Arabs from two towns and a number of villages during the 1948 war — occurred during the period of maximum threat to the survival of the pre-state Jewish population and the nascent state of Israel • To solidify claims to disputed territories, Israel has used the more moderate method of encouraging in-migration by its own citizens	• Turkey implemented its eliminationist goals: the Armenians, who put up little military resistance, were mostly killed and their remnants expelled to other parts of the Middle East and beyond; the Greeks and Assyrian Christians were almost entirely expelled • The Greek Cypriots were almost entirely expelled from the 36% of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish armed forces • The Kurds were expelled from thousands of villages and, throughout Turkey, subject to forced assimilation policies; Kurds were expelled from Turkish-controlled border regions of Syria
Threat Level	• Since independence in 1948, Israel has been threatened with complete destruction and the killing and expulsion of its Jewish population • While the conventional threat has become less severe over time, new threats of destruction and mass killing via missile barrages and nuclear weapons have emerged • Regional powers like Iran and Turkey have emerged as new enemies; Iran seeks nuclear weapons alongside its declared goal of destroying Israel • The most important former enemies that have made peace — Egypt and Jordan — have unstable governments, and might revert to their former enemy status; thus, the conventional military threat might return to former levels	• During and after World War I, Turkey was faced with significant losses of territory to Armenians and Greeks —particularly when these ethnic minorities were supported by external states • But there was never any significant possibility that the entire Turkish population would come under foreign rule • While victorious enemies might have expelled Turkish populations from disputed territories, there was never any possibility that the entire Turkish population would be killed or expelled • In Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot population was threatened only with having to accept equal treatment within a Greek-ruled state • In the conflict with the Kurds, Turkey was threatened only with the loss of predominantly Kurdish regions

SECTION 6: MAJOR ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS ACROSS ASIA, AFRICA, AND EUROPE

Israel's conflicts should be compared to all other significant ethno-territorial conflicts. These include internal conflicts in China and Russia, running across Asia from Turkey to Indonesia, and in many parts of Africa and Europe, as well as international conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

In almost every case, Israel has behaved more moderately than other countries, while facing far greater threats. The few states that have also behaved moderately—such as India, Britain, Ukraine, and Taiwan — have not been threatened, like Israel has, with total annihilation of state and people.

SECTION 7: GREAT POWER CONFLICTS: China and Russia

China and the Tibetans and Uighurs

Tibetans live mostly in China's southwestern Tibet province. There are about 6.3 million Tibetans in China, accounting for less than one percent of the population. Communist Chinese forces invaded and absorbed Tibet in 1950-1. Another round of fighting occurred in 1956-9.

Uighurs live mostly in China's northwestern Xinjiang province. There are about 11.8 million Uighurs in China, accounting for less than one percent of the population. Communist Chinese forces invaded and absorbed Xinjiang in 1949-50.

China and the Tibetans and Uighurs:
Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	China	Tibetans and Uighurs
Goals	• Assert control over Tibet and Xinjiang as parts of Chinese territory • Most actively under Mao Zedong (1949-1976) and again under Xi Jinping (2012-present), sought to forcibly assimilate Tibetans and Uighurs by prohibiting or limiting traditional religion and culture	• Tibetans: Keep or regain the political independence of the pre-1951 period and earlier periods; free exercise of traditional religion and culture • Uighurs: Independence movement has been marginal, with few active supporters; main objective of most is free exercise of traditional religion and culture
Methods	• Initially, used conventional warfare to seize Xinjiang and then Tibet • Xinjiang: Under Mao Zedong, large-scale in-migration of Chinese combined with broad assault on traditional Uighur culture; after a thaw following Mao's death, repression again intensified, especially under Xi, with traditional religion and culture limited both by high-tech surveillance state and forced re-education and labor (often in prison-like camps) of over one million Uighurs and other Turkic minorities • Tibet: Under Mao, significant in-migration combined with a broad assault on traditional Tibetan culture; 1956-9 insurgency crushed with overwhelming use of force, against both guerrillas and their civilian supporters; after a thaw following Mao's death, repression again intensified, especially under Xi, although not on the scale and intensity of Xinjiang	• Tibetans: In 1950, conventionally resisted Chinese invasion before surrendering; in 1956-9, guerrilla resistance developed in Tibetan regions in response to collectivization of agriculture and herding • Uighurs: There was limited resistance of local authorities to the original communist conquest in 1949-50; in recent decades, there have been some inter-ethnic riots and Islamist militants made a small number of guerrilla and terrorist attacks
Threat Level	• Until communist victory in 1949, China had been internally divided among different authorities, including in the Tibet and Xinjiang regions • Since 1949 in Xinjiang and 1951 in Tibet, there was no significant risk of losing territorial control, as relative power overwhelmingly favors the Chinese state	• Tibetans: Face forced loss of traditional religion and culture, and in the longer term, decline of majority status in Tibet due to Chinese in-migration • Uighurs: Face forced loss of traditional religion and culture, and have already lost majority status in Xinjiang region due to Chinese in-migration

Sources: Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 126-9; Gerry Groot, "Internment and Indoctrination — Xi's 'New Era' in Xinjiang," in Jane Golley, Linda Jaivin, Paul J. Farrelly, and Sharon Strange, eds., Power: China Story Yearbook (Acton: ANU Press, 2019), pp. 98-112.

Russia and the Chechens

Chechens live mostly in Russia's southern region of Chechnya, on the northern edge of the Caucasus mountain range. There are about 1.5 million Chechens in Chechnya, accounting for about one percent of Russia's population. Periods of intense fighting occurred in 1994-6 and again from 1999 to the present.

Russia and the Chechens:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Russia	Chechens
Goals	• Sought to retain territorial control over Chechnya • In early 1990s, offered regional political autonomy	• Sought independent Chechen state, and later, a larger Islamic Emirate (state) in Russia's North Caucasus region
Methods	• From 1994, fought indiscriminate war against rebel-held cities and villages, killing large numbers of civilians in the process • Conducted targeted killings of suspected rebels and rebel collaborators — over time relying more on Chechen proxy forces	• 1991: Seized power in Chechnya • From 1994, used conventional and guerrilla warfare to secure independence • Conducted targeted killings of actual and suspected collaborators with Russia • Conducted terrorist attacks on civilians both locally and far beyond Chechnya • Forcibly expelled ethnic Russian population
Threat Level	• Chechen rebels able to fight Russian forces with surprising effectiveness, given Russia's huge size and resource advantages; Russia lost control of Chechnya for significant periods of time • Early Chechen successes indicated potential for broader secessionist threat, especially in Russia's North Caucasus region — though this threat has not developed on a large scale	• Faced no significant threat before secession attempt • Offered regional political autonomy after Soviet collapse

Main rebel organizations: Chechen Republic of Ichkeria; Caucasus Emirate; Islamic State — Caucasus Province.
Sources: John B. Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 101-6, 117-8, 126, 134-9, 209; International Crisis Group, "**The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Islam, the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency**," Europe Report 221, October 19, 2012, pp. 12-29; Richard Sakwa, ed., *Chechnya: From Past to Future* (London: Anthem Press, 2005), esp. pp. 3-4, 11, 15-6, 22, 80-4, 86, 99, 101, 227, 230, 234-5.

Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds

Iraqi Kurds live mostly in Iraq's northern mountainous region. There are about 8.5 million Kurds in Iraq, accounting for 15-20 percent of Iraq's population. The periods of most intense fighting have been from 1961 to 1996 and in 2017. Other large Kurdish populations are settled across the borders in Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Iraq	Iraqi Kurds
Goals	• During early stage of Kurdish rebellion, in 1961-9, sought to crush all Kurdish resistance and impose repressive, centralized state control • In 1969-90, Saddam Hussein sought demographic Arabization of most Iraqi Kurdistan • During the war with Iran, Saddam Hussein's goals expanded to genocidal killing of a large proportion of Kurds • Since Saddam Hussein's 2003 overthrow, new Shia-dominated Iraqi governments have sought, with only limited success, to regain control over Kurdish regions	• Since 1943, and most intensively in 1961-96, sought de facto independence from Iraq for large regions, including ethnically mixed regions containing Kirkuk oil fields
Methods	• In 1961-9, in addition to conventional warfare and counter-insurgency, indiscriminately attacked Kurdish villages, including systematic aerial bombing (sometimes with chemical weapons); affected 75% of villages, destroying close to 1000 villages, and forcibly expelling hundreds of thousands • In 1969-90, under Saddam Hussein, in addition to indiscriminate conventional warfare and counter-insurgency, Arabization was pursued via forced expulsions of Kurds and Arab resettlement in some Kurdish areas, alongside a more general cultural Arabization • During the war with Iran, mass executions and chemical weapon attacks were also used as part of a systematic effort to eliminate the Kurdish presence in most of Kurdistan • Overall, over 4000 Kurdish villages were destroyed (over 86%), over 1.5 million Kurds expelled (well over half of Kurdish-settled territory), and more than 200,000 civilians killed	• Employed conventional and guerrilla warfare against Iraqi security forces • Sometimes kidnapped foreign oil workers and shelled oil infrastructure • In intra-Kurdish rivalries, sometimes used forced expulsions and terror alongside regular warfare and assassinations

CONTINUED

	Iraq	Iraqi Kurds
Threat Level	• Significant risk of secession of Iraqi Kurdistan; at times of Iraqi state weakness, Kurdish rebels have repeatedly overrun large Kurdish-claimed regions • After 1990-1 Gulf War, with foreign, especially U.S. assistance, Kurds have enjoyed de facto control over large parts of Iraqi Kurdistan	• Until 1969, threatened with repressive central control under successive authoritarian regimes • In 1969-90, forcibly expelled from a large share of Iraqi Kurdistan • During the war with Iran, genocidal mass killings • Genocidal threat remained until Saddam Hussein was overthrown by U.S.-led 2003 invasion • Since 2003, new Shia-dominated Iraqi governments have sought, with limited success, to regain effective control over Kurdish-controlled regions; only U.S. support prevents the threat, which includes repression and possibly forced assimilation, from materializing

Main rebel organizations: Kurdistan Democratic Party; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Sources: David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds,* revised ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 307-17, 337, 343-51, 414-6, 420-1, 425; Michiel Leezenberg, "The *Anfal* Operations in Iraqi Kurdistan," in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, eds., *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012), pp. 414-6, 420-1, 425.

Iran and the Iranian Kurds

Iranian Kurds live mostly in Iran's western mountainous regions, near the borders with Iraq and Turkey. There are 9-10 million Kurds in Iran, accounting for over 10 percent of Iran's population. The most intense fighting was in 1979-93. Other large Kurdish populations are settled across the borders in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.

Iran and the Iranian Kurds:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Iran	Iranian Kurds
Goals	• Forced assimilation of Kurds as part of larger project of imposing regime's preferred version of Shia Islam on the entire state and society — including on ethnic minorities that, like the Kurds, are mostly Sunni Muslims	• Political autonomy of Kurdish regions within Iranian state • Potential to escalate to demand for independence of Kurdish regions
Methods	• Use of indiscriminate conventional force and low-intensity terror to crush Kurdish rebels, most intensively in 1979-93 • Forced cultural assimilation and systematic discrimination against the overwhelming majority of Kurds who do accept the state religious ideology	• Conventional and guerrilla warfare to gain control over Kurdish regions in 1979-93, and, thereafter, on a smaller, more sporadic scale
Threat Level	• Significant risk of losing control over Kurdish regions, especially during the early period when the Islamic Republic had not consolidated power	• Faced repression and long-term discrimination as part of Iranian regime's forced assimilation effort

Main rebel organization: Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.
Source: David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds,* revised ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 261-78.

SECTION 9: NEAR EASTERN CONFLICTS: Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh

Pakistan and the Bengalis

Bengalis are the predominant population of present-day Bangladesh, which from 1947 until 1971 was part of present-day Pakistan. The present-day territory of Bangladesh (then called East Pakistan) had a 1971 population of about 70 million, as compared to a 1971 population

Pakistan and the Bengalis:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Pakistan	Bengalis
Goals	•Sought to retain centralized control over all territory by crushing separatist Awami League and its Bengali supporters after their 1970 election victory •Offered equal treatment as individuals under a semi-authoritarian political system	•In 1971, sought de facto and then formal independence for the western part of Pakistan •Non-Bengalis were promised equal citizenship
Methods	•Attacks were not only on Bengali police and militia, but also on civilians •Initial mass killings focused on Bengali nationalist elites and students, Hindus, and urban slums; second phase saw mass rapes (about 200,000) and intensified mass killings (broadened to target all young Bengali males); with defeat immanent, killings refocused on professional and intellectual elites •Massive destruction and looting occurred in the cities •Killings were on genocidal scale: estimates range from 300,000 to nearly three million •Carnage drove 10 million to flee to India and 30 million to flee internally	•Initially non-violent efforts turned, following Pakistan's all-out attack, to guerrilla warfare, and following India's military intervention, to conventional warfare •Actual and alleged collaborators of Pakistani military were widely targeted for killings, with ethnic Biharis suffering disproportionately
Threat Level	•Given the huge Bengali population (bigger than East Pakistan's) and West Pakistan's geographical separation, there was a very significant threat of secession •Indian military intervention rapidly secured independence for what became Bangladesh	•Before war, Bengalis faced long-term repression •With the onset of war, Bengalis faced genocidal killings, along with rapes, expulsions, and property destruction and looting

Main rebel organization: Awami League.
Source: Rounaq Jahan, "Genocide in Bangladesh," in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, eds., *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012), pp. 269-77, 284.

Pakistan and the Baloch

Pakistan's Baloch people live mostly in Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan province. There are about five million Baloch in Pakistan, accounting for a little over two percent of Pakistan's population. The periods of most intense fighting were in 1974-7 and from 2004 to the present. Another sizeable Baloch population is settled across the border in Iran.

Pakistan and the Baloch:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Pakistan	Bengalis
Goals	• Sought to defend not only Pakistan's territorial sovereignty, but also to retain the centralized structure of the Pakistani state • Offered equal rights under the existing, often repressive political system	• 1974-7: Initially demanded autonomy, and then, after Pakistan's crackdown, independence for Balochistan province • 2004-present: Armed organizations seek an independent Balochistan
Methods	• 1972: Persecuted Baloch politicians demanding greater autonomy • 1974-7 and 2004-present: Used overwhelming force to crush insurgency, including, in selected areas crucial to the insurgency, killings of civilians and destruction of civilian settlements and food sources • 2004-present: Targeted killings of thousands of Baloch nationalists and suspected supporters	• Small-scale separatist insurgency occurred as far back as 1948, and again in 1958-9 and 1963-9 • 1974-7: Organized guerrilla warfare against Pakistani army; attacked energy and transport infrastructure • 2004-present: Guerrilla attacks on military targets and infrastructure; terror attacks on non-Baloch civilians, including government and Chinese workers
Threat Level	• Threatened with loss of Baluchistan province; but threat not high given huge military and resource advantage of Pakistani state	• During periods of lesser as well as greater conflict, threatened with ongoing repression, killings, and demographic marginalization in Balochistan province

Main rebel organization: Baloch Republican Army, Baloch Liberation Army.

Sources: *Abreen Agha, "Pakistan: Unending Tragedy in Balochistan — Analysis," Eurasia Review,* December 3, 2012; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 355-61; South Asia Terrorism Portal, "*Balochistan: Assessment, 2021*," 2021.

India and the Kashmiri Muslims, Nagas, Assamese, and Sikhs

- India's Kashmiri Muslims live mostly in India's northwestern Jammu and Kashmir province. There are about 8-9 million Kashmiri Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir province, accounting for less than one percent of India's population. The most intense conflict occurred from 1989 to the present

- India's Nagas live mostly in India's northeastern Nagaland province. There are about 2.5 million Nagas in India, of which about 1.6 million live in Nagaland province, accounting for much less than one percent of India's population. The most intense conflict occurred from 1956 to 2000.

- India's Assamese live mostly in India's northeastern Assam province. There are about 15 million Assamese in India, predominantly in Assam province, accounting for about one percent of India's population. The most intense period of conflict was 1990-2010.

- India's Sikhs live mostly in India's northwestern Punjab province. There were about 16 million Sikhs in Punjab province, accounting for about one percent of India's population. The most intense conflict occurred in 1983-93.

India and the Kashmiri Muslims, Nagas, Assamese, and Sikhs:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	India	Ethnic Minority Groups
Goals	• Kashmiri Muslims: Seeks to retain sovereignty over parts of Kashmir controlled since First Kashmir War with Pakistan; until 2020, offered higher-than-normal level of autonomy to Kashmir provincial unit; promised equal rights to all citizens • Nagas, Assamese, and Sikhs: Sought to retain sovereignty over disputed region; offered special autonomy arrangements; promised equal rights to all citizens	• Kashmiri Muslims: Secession of Kashmir from India, usually to join Pakistan; expulsion or forced assimilation of non-Muslim residents • Nagas: Sought an independent Nagaland • Assamese: Sought an independent Assam; sought to expel in-migrants who imperiled Assamese demographic dominance • Sikhs: Demanded an informally or formally independent Sikh homeland in Sikh-dominated regions; aimed to expel Hindus from heavily Sikh regions
Methods	• Kashmir: Counter-insurgency methods have been used against militants; methods have oscillated between relying more on central government security rule and restoring greater local control; security forces are generally well-disciplined, though there have been a significant number of incidents of excessive civilian casualties and forced disappearances • Nagas: Conducted counter-insurgency targeting Naga rebels, generally in a discriminating way that avoided civilian casualties; under Nehru, conducted a forced village resettlement program in areas of high rebel activity; in 1963, created a special Nagaland state with hiagher-than-normal autonomy • Assamese: Conducted discriminating counter-insurgency while trying to negotiate an autonomy-based peace agreement • Sikhs: Conducted an increasingly discriminating counter-insurgency while trying to negotiate an autonomy-based peace agreement	• Kashmiri Muslims: in addition to guerrilla attacks on Indian security forces, regular terror attacks on civilians (including moderate Muslim elites in Kashmir), extending to other parts of India; forcibly expelled most Hindus from Kashmir Valley, and attempted to expel non-Muslims from other parts of Kashmir • Nagas: Fought a guerrilla war targeting Indian security forces • Assamese: Attacked Indian security forces, infrastructure, non-Assamese civilians (especially in-migrants from Bangladesh and other parts of India), and moderate Assamese politicians • Sikhs: Attacked police and security forces; attacked Hindu civilians to drive them from heavily Sikh regions; attacked moderate Sikhs to impose control over Sikh population

	India	Ethnic Minority Groups
Threat Level	• Kashmiri Muslims: Some threat of losing Indian-controlled Kashmir, especially since Pakistan has assisted and exercised increasing control over the many Kashmiri jihadist organizations; military balance increasingly favors India, making such a loss highly unlikely • Nagas, Assamese, and Sikhs: Threat of secession extremely low given relative strength of Indian state	• Kashmiri Muslims: Faced no threat other than having to live as equal citizens within India, with a high degree of autonomy at the provincial level • Nagas and Sikhs: No significant threat; able to live as equal citizens, and were offered high degree of autonomy • Assamese: Although offered equal citizenship and regional autonomy, faced threat of demographic marginalization due to in-migration from Bangladesh and other parts of India

Note: Additional, similar ethno-territorial conflicts have occurred on a smaller scale in India's Northeast region.

Major rebel organizations: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Hizbul Mujahedeen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad (Kashmiri Muslims); Naga National Council, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Nagas); United Liberation Front of Assam (Assamese); All India Sikh Students Federation (Sikhs).

Sources: Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), pp. 112-35, 190-1, 196-205, 209-17, 222-55, 274-305; Jugdep S. Chima, *The Sikh Separatist Insurgency: Political Leadership and Ethnonationalist Movements* (New Delhi: Sage, 2010),
pp. 45-6, 66-73, 91-3, 114-6, 129, 131, 133-4, 136, 138-9, 149-50, 159-63, 167-9, 187-8, 191, 195-8, 204-5, 219-20; Nani Gopal Mahanta, *Confronting the State: ULFA's Struggle for Sovereignty* (New Delhi: Sage, 2013), pp. 58-74, 92-7, 102-5, 141-2, 252-70; annual assessments of the different conflicts at the *South Asian Terrorism Portal.*

Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan Tamils

The Sri Lankan Tamils live mostly in Sri Lanka's north and in the eastern coastal region. In 2012, there were about 2.3 million Sri Lankan Tamils, accounting for about 10 percent of Sri Lanka's population. The most intense conflict was in 1983-2009.

Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan Tamils:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils
Goals	• Sought to retain possession of heavily Tamil regions • Sought more equal outcomes in education and government jobs via discrimination in favor of dominant Sinhalese ethnic group • After war broke out, long offered political autonomy, alongside equal treatment of individual citizens	• Sought an independent Tamil state over all regions with significant Tamil populations; sought to expel non-Tamil populations
Methods	• July 1983: A state-facilitated pogrom across Sri Lanka killed hundreds or thousands of Tamil civilians • Conventional warfare and counterinsurgency against Sri Lankan Tamil fighters • Often used terror to intimidate Tamil civilians suspected of supporting militants • Often used indiscriminate warfare in attacking Tamil-held regions • Sponsored Sinhalese settlement in large regions disputed with Sri Lankan Tamils	• Conventional and guerrilla war against Sri Lankan security forces • Conducted terror campaigns against non-Tamil minorities and Tamil moderates • Conducted forced expulsions of non-Tamils from claimed territories
Threat Level	• Faced significant threat of losing large regions mostly or heavily populated by Tamils • After war started, non-Tamil populations of disputed regions faced significant threat of forced expulsion	• Faced some discrimination in education and government administration • Faced significant in-migration of ethnic Sinhalese in some regions • Over most of the conflict, a high degree of autonomy was offered

Main rebel organization: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Sources: Neil DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," Asian Survey 49, 6 (November/December 2009), pp. 1021-51; Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 5, 8-9, 22-34, 89, 97-114, 122, 130-40, 152, 162-3; Shale Horowitz and Buddhika Jayamaha, "Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Ethnic Conflict," in Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo, eds., *Civil Wars of the World* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007), pp. 715-34; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan. 2013. "Sri Lanka, 1976–2009: Case Outcome: COIN Win," in Paul Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan, eds., *Paths to Victory* (RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 423-40; Jagath Senaratne, *Political Violence in Sri Lanka*, 1977-1990: *Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997), pp. 44-5, 81-2, 73-9, 85, 88, 102, 148.

Bangladesh and the Jummas (Chittagong Hill Tribes)

The Jummas, tribal peoples living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in southeastern Bangladesh, number about 500,000—far less than one percent of Bangladesh's population. The most intense conflict occurred in 1976-91.

Bangladesh and the Jummas (Chittagong Hill Tribes):
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Bangladesh	Jummas
Goals	• Forced assimilation of Jummas, alongside mass in-migration of Bengalis	• Sought an autonomous region for Jummas
Methods	• Counter-insurgency against Jumma guerrillas • Large-scale targeted killings of suspected supporters of Jumma fighters • Frequent massacres of Jumma civilians • Widespread forced expulsions from villages, not limited to areas of heavy fighting • Mass in-migration of Bengalis	• Guerrilla attacks on military targets • Retaliatory terror attacks on Bengali civilians
Threat Level	• Given state's huge military superiority, did not face significant threat of losing territory	• Faced forced assimilation and widespread forced expulsion • In-migration by Bengalis has turned Jummas into a minority in their traditional areas of settlement

Main rebel organization: United People's Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Sources: Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, "Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts," *Asian Survey* 29, 10 (1989), pp. 959-70; Suhas Chakma, "Chittagong Hill Tracts: Appalling Violence," *Economic and Political Weekly* 27, 42 (1992), pp. 2295-6; Amena Mohsin, *The Chittagong Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road to Peace* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 14-16, 22-4, 30-5, 39-46, 55, 61-3.

SECTION 10: SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONFLICTS: Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia

Burma and the Karen, Shan, Kachin, and Rohingya

- Burma's Karen people live mostly in the central-eastern border region (especially in Kayin province) and in the southwestern Irrawaddy Delta region. There are about four million Karen, accounting for about seven percent of Burma's population. The most intense conflict was in 1949-2011 and from 2021 to the present.

- Burma's Shan people live mostly in the northeastern border region (especially in Shan province). There are about five million Shan, accounting for about nine percent of Burma's population. The most intense conflict occurred from 1959 to the present.

- Burma's Kachin people live mostly in the northern border region (especially in Kachin province). There are about one million Kachin, accounting for about two percent of Burma's population. The most intense conflict occurred in 1961-92 and from 2011 to the present.

- Burma's Rohingya people, before their recent mass expulsion to Bangladesh, lived mostly in northern Rakhine province. There are about 1.5 million Rohingyas, accounting for 2-3 percent of Burma's population. The most intense conflict was in 1948-61, 1972-2001, and above all, from 2016 to the present.

Burma and the Karen, Shan, Kachin, and Rohingya:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Burma	Ethnic Minority
Goals	•All ethnic groups: State has sought to retain control over all sovereign territory; has refused to offer any concessions beyond equal treatment under the existing political system	•Karen, Shan, Kachin, Rohingya, and others: Have sought either formal independence or de facto independence in an "equal federal union" of peoples
Methods	•Same strategies used to fight all ethnic groups •Before 1966, counter-insurgency against ethnic guerrillas included indiscriminate attacks on villages, in which civilians were killed and villages destroyed •From 1966, older methods supplemented by more systematic "Four Cuts" campaigns, in which offensives destroyed villages in contested areas, killed non-compliant civilians, and either deported villagers to settlements in heavily garrisoned areas or forced them to flee toward the periphery or across international borders — depopulating large regions once settled by restive ethnic minorities	•Karen: Conventional and then guerrilla warfare against Burmese military; selectively targeted local civilians to impose control •Shan: Guerrilla warfare against Burmese military; at times (1959-63), killed government workers or Shan who worked with government; at times (1985-95), selectively targeted local civilians to impose control •Kachin: Guerrilla warfare against Burmese military; selectively targeted local civilians to impose control •Rohingya: Guerrilla warfare against Burmese military; selectively targeted local civilians to impose control
Threat Level	•Faced loss of significant territory in peripheral ethnic regions, given the number and scale of rebel movements	•All ethnic groups before war started: Faced equal treatment under often highly repressive political system •All ethnic groups once war started: Faced mass expulsion and depopulation of regions where rebels contested control over territory •Rohingya since 2016: Majority of population expelled to Bangladesh

Note: Additional, similar ethno-territorial conflicts have occurred on a smaller scale along Burma's inland periphery.

Main rebel organizations: Karen National Union (Karen); Kachin Independence Organization (Kachin); Shan State Independence Army, Shan State Army, Shan United Revolutionary Army, Mong Thai Army (Shan); Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Rohingya Solidarity Organization (Rohingya).

Sources: Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, *"The Rohingya Crisis"* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020); Facts and Details, *"Karen and Karenni Insurgency and Fighting in Karen and Kayah States"* (2023); Bertil Lintner, *Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948* (Chiang Mai: Silkwom, 1999), pp. 11-9, 171-3, 195-9, 201, 224, 229-30, 232-4, 237, 239, 260-2, 279-80, 282, 285-7, 302-4, 313-4, 323-6, 359, 380, 391, 402-3, 405-6, 411-3; Kachin Women's Association Thailand, *"Deadly Reprisals: Regime Steps Up Attacks on Civilians in Retaliation for Conflict Losses in Northern Burma"* (Chiang Mai: Kachin Women's Association Thailand, 2021) Shan Human Rights Foundation, *Reports and Updates* (various dates); Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed, 1999), pp. 30, 93-4, 99, 114-8, 137-54, 168, 170-4, 183-6, 189-94, 199-200, 207-10, 213-8, 220-1, 257-62, 265-7, 270, 274, 280-7, 294, 307-9, 320-1, 329-35, 340-4, 356-61, 379, 385-99, 401, 407-11, 425-31, 439, 443, 446-9; Martin Smith, "Ethnic Politics in Myanmar: A Year of Tension and Anticipation." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (2010), 214-34.

Thailand and the Pattani Malays

THAILAND — Administrative Divisions

1. Ang Thong
2. Chai Nat
3. Krung Thep Mahanakhon (Bangkok)
4. Nakhon Nayok
5. Nakhon Pathom
6. Nonthaburi
7. Pathum Thani
8. Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya
9. Prachin Buri
10. Samut Prakan
11. Samut Sakhon
12. Samut Songkhram
13. Sing Buri

International boundary
Province (changwat) boundary
National capital
Province (changwat) capital

Thailand has 76 provinces (changwat) and one municipality (Bangkok).

Provinces have the same name as their capitals.

Scale 1:7,800,000

LAMBERT CONFORMAL CONIC PROJECTION; STANDARD PARALLELS 18° 00′ N 8° 50′ N   803532AI (G03664) 2-13

Thailand's Pattani Malays live mostly in the far south near the border with Malaysia (mainly in the southernmost five provinces). There are about 1.5 million Pattani Malays, accounting for about two percent of Thailand's population. The most intense conflict occurred from 2003 to the present.

Thailand and the Pattani Malays:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Thailand	Pattani Malays
Goals	•Retain control over predominantly Pattani Malay regions	•An independent Islamic emirate with Shariah law in Pattani Malay regions •Forced expulsion of non-Muslims
Methods	•Counter-insurgency against low-intensity guerrilla and terror attacks •Targeted killings of suspected insurgents and insurgent supporters •Inadequate discipline and training often leads to excessive civilian casualties	•Guerrilla warfare against Thai military and police •Regular killings of Buddhist civilians and targeted killings of moderate Muslim elites •Forced expulsion of Buddhist civilian populations
Threat Level	•Face loss of predominantly Pattani Malay regions in southernmost Thailand, but highly unlikely given large power advantage of Thai state	•Face equal treatment in Thai political system

Main rebel organization: Pattani Malays National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate.

Sources: Zachary Abuza, *Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), pp. 81, 125-9, 133-4, 141-2, 163-209; Zachary Abuza, *"The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics" (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2011); Austin Bodetti, "Thailand's Quiet Crisis: 'The Southern Problem,'" Diplomat, July 12, 2019.*

The Philippines and the Moros

The Philippine's Moro people live mostly in southern islands of the Philippine archipelago (mainly in part of Mindanao). There are about five million Moros, accounting for 4-5 percent of the Philippines' population. The most intense conflict occurred from 1972 to the present.

The Philippines and the Moros:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Philippines	Moros
Goals	•Preserving control over all Philippine territory •Since 1986 fall of Marcos regime, willing to grant political autonomy to large Moro-dominated regions	•Sought either independence or political autonomy in Moro regions •Later, Islamist rebels (active since 1977) have sought to create an Islamic state in Moro regions, including the goals of forcibly assimilating or expelling non-Muslims
Methods	•Under Marcos, Philippine military used indiscriminate warfare against Moro rebels — killing large numbers of Moro civilians in the process; Philippine troops were often poorly disciplined, killing and harassing many Moros •Since 1986, alongside efforts to come to an autonomy agreement, Philippine military has used a more discriminating counter-insurgency strategy (with some backsliding toward a more indiscriminate counter-insurgency in 1998-2001)	•The earliest rebel organization fought a conventional and guerrilla war against the state, but did not target civilians •Later, Islamist rebel organizations, in addition to fighting a guerrilla war against the state security forces, regularly targeted non-Moro civilians
Threat Level	•Given the Philippine state's significant size and resource advantages, risk of losing control over Moro regions in battle has been very low •Since 1977, non-Moro civilians in and near Moro regions have been threatened with death and expulsion; there have been periodic attacks on civilians outside the Moro regions	•Treated as equal citizens •Faced prospect of increasing predominance of Philippine Christians in traditional Moro areas of settlement — resulting from a state-sponsored program of Christian settlement •Since Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown in 1986, Moros have had the option of local political autonomy — implemented in various forms since 1989

Main rebel organizations: Moro National Liberation Front; Moro Islamic Liberation Front; Abu Sayyaf.

Sources: Zachary Abuza and Luke Lischin, *The Challenges Facing the Philippines' Bangsmoro Autonomous Region at One Year* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2020), pp. 3, 17-8; Jacques Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is Fragile." *Pacific Affairs* 73, 1 (2000), 37-54; Rodelio Cruz-Manacsa and Alex Tan, "The Philippines, 1972-1996," in Karl DeRouen, Jr., and Uk Heo, eds., *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2007), pp. 617-34; Mike Fowler, "Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now," *Small Wars Journal*, January 2011, pp. 1-15; Syed Serajul Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines," *Asian Survey* 38, 5 (1998), pp. 441-56; Lela G. Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate," *Asian Survey* 21, 11 (1981), pp. 1097-1114; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, "Philippines (MNLF), 1971–1996: Case Outcome: COIN Win (Mixed, Favoring COIN)," in Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, eds., *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 346-54; Paul A. Rodell, "The Philippines and the Challenge of International Terrorism," in Paul J. Smith, ed., T*error and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 122-44; Benedikt Seemann, "Bandits or Terrorists?: The Abu Sayyaf Group between Economic Interests and Religious Ideals," in Gerhard Wahlers, ed., *The Globalisation of Terrorism* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2016), pp. 38-49.

Indonesia and the West Papuans, East Timorese, and Acehnese

Indonesia's West Papuan people live in the formerly Dutch-ruled West Papua territory, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1963. There are about 1.8 million indigenous (or Melanesian) West Papuans, accounting for far less than one percent of Indonesia's population. The most intense conflict occurred from 1965 to the present.

Indonesia's former East Timorese people live in the formerly Portuguese-ruled East Timor territory, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1975. There are about 1.5 million East Timorese, who, while under Indonesian rule, accounted for far less than one percent of Indonesia's population. The most intense conflict occurred in 1975-98.

Indonesia's Acehnese people live mostly in Aceh province. There are about four million Acehnese, accounting for one to two percent of Indonesia's population. The most intense conflict occurred in 1990-2005.

Indonesia and West Papuans, East Timorese, and Acehnese:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Indonesia	West Papuans, East Timorese, and Acehnese
Goals	• West Papuans: After seizing control of West Papua from the Dutch in 1961-2, have sought to retain possession • East Timorese: Under Suharto (through 1998), seized territory in 1975 after Portuguese withdrew and sought to retain possession; after Suharto's fall in 1998, Habibie allowed a referendum, which led to East Timor's independence in 2002 • Acehnese: Retain territorial control over Aceh region; since 1999, pursued autonomy compromise to end fighting — as ultimately happened in 2005	• West Papuans: Seek an independent state in West Papua • East Timorese: Sought an independent state in East Timor • Acehnese: Sought independence or (later on) autonomy for Aceh region, alongside capacity to implement Islamist goals such as Shariah law
Methods	• West Papuans: Counter-insurgency in 1965-98 sought to defeat rebels by killing civilians and destroying or bombing villages in disputed areas (civilian deaths almost certainly exceeded 100,000, well in excess of 5% of the West Papuan population); counter-insurgency since 1998 has been less punitive, but still targets civilians regularly; large-scale program of in-migration is approaching point where West Papuans will become a minority in their region of traditional settlement • East Timorese: Under Suharto, there were frequent mass killings of civilians during the initial conquest and later counter-insurgency (civilian deaths probably exceeded 200,000, over 20% of the East Timorese population); even as Habibie began to negotiate, the Indonesian military conducted another massive attack on East Timorese civilians, displacing over half the population; large-scale program of in-migration brought non-East Timorese population beyond 10% of the East Timor total • Acehnese: Alongside counter-insurgency against rebel fighters, regularly killed civilians in areas of fighting in effort to deny support to rebels; before outbreak of conflict, there was a large-scale in-migration program	• West Papuans: Mainly targeted Indonesian security forces; attacks on civilians were rare • East Timorese: Mainly fought a guerrilla war against Indonesian security forces — although there were targeted killings of hundreds accused of collaborating with Indonesia • Acehnese: Alongside guerrilla warfare against Indonesian security forces, killed civilians to drive out non-Acehnese, destroy local government administration, and impose its own political control

|	Indonesia	West Papuans, East Timorese, and Acehnese
Threat Level	• Given huge relative power disparities, little risk of losing military control over disputed territories • East Timorese: Decision to allow an independence referendum was a political decision by a new leader, and not at all compelled by the military balance of power	• West Papuans: Before war, threatened with political repression, long-term assimilation, and possible loss of majority status in West Papua; during war, at least 5% and possibly more than 10% of the population have been killed • East Timorese: Before war, threatened with political repression and long-term assimilation; during war, suffered genocidal-scale killing, probably exceeding 20% of the population • Acehnese: Treated as equal citizens

Note: Additional, similar ethno-territorial conflicts have occurred on a smaller scale.

Rebel organizations: Free Papua Movement (West Papua); Falintil/Fretelin (East Timor); Free Aceh Movement (Aceh).

Sources: Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 110, 173; Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 92-3, 137-59, 171-8, 182, 205-6; James Dunn, *East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence* (Double Bay: Longueville, 2003), pp. 244-7, 251-3, 260-7, 271-6, 283, 286-8, 292-7, 336, 340-58, 362; James Dunn, "Genocide in East Timor," in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, eds., *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2012), pp. 297-316; Otto Ondawame, *'One People, One Soul': West Papuan Nationalism and Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)/Free Papua Movement,* PhD Dissertation (Australian National University, 2000), pp. 8, 95-7, 105-10, 112, 116-9, 122, 125-30, 134-5, 142-4, 162-9, 172, 187; Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. xvi, 2, 28-38, 46-8, 54, 56, 69-70, 72-3, 77, 79-80, 92, 97, 103-5, 127-39, 146; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 374-9; Kirsten E. Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy of GAM," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26, 4 (2003), pp. 241-71.

SECTION 11: MAJOR AFRICAN CONFLICTS: Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, and Ethiopia*

Morocco and the Sahrawis

Morocco's Sahrawi people live in the formerly Spanish-ruled Western Sahara territory, which was annexed by Morocco in 1976 and 1979. There are about 500,000 Sahrawis, accounting for a little over one percent of Morocco's population. The most intense conflict was in 1975-88.

*For space reasons, other significant African ethno-territorial conflicts – such as those in Cameroon, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal – are not covered here.

Morocco and the Sahrawis:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Morocco	Sahrawis
Goals	• Impose and maintain territorial control over former Spanish Sahara territory • Offered regional autonomy within the Moroccan state, while pursuing an in-migration program to create a Moroccan majority in the region	• Sought independence in the former Spanish Sahara territory, which was annexed by Morocco in 1976
Methods	• Indiscriminate warfare and killings of civilians, along with more targeted killings of suspected supporters of Sahrawi rebels, led roughly half of Sahrawis to flee to Algeria; later in the war, counter-insurgency became more discriminating, though it was coupled with continued targeted killings of suspected civilian supporters of Sahrawi rebels • Program to resettle Moroccans has made Sahrawis a minority in the Western Sahara region • Little fighting since 1988 cease-fire	• Fought conventional and guerrilla war against Moroccan security forces • Moroccan soldiers were often killed after capture • Little fighting since 1988 cease-fire
Threat Level	• Faced risk of military defeat leading to an independent Western Sahara	• Before war, faced integration into Moroccan state and probable loss of majority status in Western Sahara region • Have become a minority in the region due to Moroccan in-migration program

Rebel organization: Polisario Front.

Sources: Geoffrey Jensen, *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, 2013), pp. 12-9, 23, 29-54, 57-60, 63; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 395-9.

Sudan and the South Sudanese Christians and Animists

Sudan's former South Sudanese people live in the formerly ruled southern regions of Sudan. In 2011, when South Sudan formally gained independence, there were about ten million South Sudanese, accounting for about 30 percent of Sudan's population. The most intense conflict occurred in 1963-72 and in 1983-2005.

Sudan and South Sudanese Christians and Animists:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Sudan	South Sudanese
Goals	• Sought to retain territorial control over the South • Leaders in some periods offered autonomy • Most Sudanese governments sought forcible assimilation of Southerners into North's Arab and Islamic culture and identity — most aggressively under Bashir in 1989-2005	• Sought autonomy or independence for the South Sudan region
Methods	• In both 1963-72 and 1983-2005, rebels faced total war on their rural base areas, destroying villages and killing and expelling their inhabitants; in towns and cities, there were periodic massacres of Southern civilians • During the second war, Sudanese military widely used proxy militias and, in strategic border regions, formal forced resettlement programs • In 1963-72, hundreds of thousands of Southern civilians were killed • In 1983-2005, an estimated two million Southern civilians were killed • Sudan-South Sudan violence mostly ended from 2005 when Bashir accepted an independence referendum —which in 2011 led to an independent South Sudan	• 1963-72: Guerrilla warfare against Sudanese security forces; poorly disciplined troops often killed both Northern and Southern civilians and looted local villages; similar, smaller-scale conflict occurred as early as 1955 • 1983-2005: Guerrilla and conventional warfare against Sudanese security forces; indiscriminate warfare regularly killed civilians; intra-rebel fighting involved destruction of villages and killings of civilians
Threat Level	• Significant threat of rebel military victory, which would have led to South Sudan independence	• Before and during wars, Southerners faced with forced assimilation • During wars, Southerners in areas of fighting faced with killing or expulsion

Main rebel organizations: Anya-Nya (1963-72); Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (1983-2005).
Sources: Tim Allen, "Full Circle? An Overview of Sudan's 'Southern Problem' since Independence," *Northeast African Studies* 11, 2 (1989), pp. 41-66; J. Bowyer Bell, "The Conciliation of Insurgency: The Sudanese Experience," *Military Affairs* 39, 3 (1975), pp. 105-14; Robert O. Collins, "Civil War in Sudan," *Journal of Third World Studies* 5, 1 (1988), pp. 66-83; Alex de Waal, "The Nuba Mountains, Sudan," in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, eds., *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts* (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2012), pp. 438-63; Sharon E. Hutchinson, "A Curse from God? Religious and Political Dimensions of the Post-1991 Rise of Ethnic Violence in South Sudan," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, 2 (2001), pp. 307-31; Clayton L. Thyne, "Civil War in Sudan, 1983-2005," in Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo, eds., *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2007), pp. 735-52.

Nigeria and the Igbos and Middle-Belt Christians

Nigeria's Igbo people live mostly in southeastern Nigeria. There are about 35 million Igbos, accounting for about 15 percent of Nigeria's population. The most intense conflict was in 1967-70.

Nigeria's Middle-Belt Christians live scattered across central provinces of Nigeria. There are about 30 million Middle-Belt Christians, accounting for about 13 percent of Nigeria's population. The most intense conflict occurred from 2009 to the present.

Nigeria and the Igbos and Middle-Belt Christians:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Nigeria	Igbos and Middle-Belt Christians
Goals	•Igbos: Sought to retain territorial control and to weaken Igbo political and economic influence •Middle-Belt Christians: Militias of Muslim Fulani herdsmen, sometimes supported by jihadist fighters, seek to kill, expropriate, and expel Christian farmers and sometimes Muslim farmers, with government security forces either unable or unwilling to protect the targeted populations	•Igbos: Sought autonomy or independence •Middle-Belt Christians: Sought to keep their land, property, and lives
Methods	•Igbos: Nigerian military tolerated and often participated in prewar massacre of 80,000-100,000 Igbos and other Easterners; conventional war against rebels included frequent massacres, widespread rape, indiscriminate warfare (including bombings of civilian areas), and a blockade probably resulting in over 500,000 deaths •Middle-Belt Christians: Fulani militias have killed over ten thousand civilians, while looting and burning Christian villages and expelling their populations; Nigerian military has done little to protect Christians	•Igbos: Fought conventional and guerrilla war for independence; retaliatory killings of Northerners took place in the Igbos' eastern region, though on a much smaller scale — with many other Northerners fleeing to the North •Middle-Belt Christians: While sometimes trying to defend themselves and sometimes retaliating against Fulani militias, mostly have tried to flee from attacks; some retaliatory killings of Fulani civilians
Threat Level	•Igbos: Faced significant threat of losing war and seeing the Eastern Province secede •Middle-Belt Christians: While there is rivalry and local conflict over land use, Middle-Belt Christians and other targeted farmers are not threatening Fulani in an organized fashion	•Igbos: Before war, faced economic and political discrimination from central government; 80,000-100,000 Igbo and other eastern civilians were killed in Northern region massacres, with many others fleeing to the east •Middle-Belt Christians: Large numbers face death or expulsion

Main rebel organization: Republic of Biafra.

Sources: *Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 166-77; Michael Gould, *The Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War,* 1967-1970 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 31-3, 48-9, 62-5, 70, 80-1, 87, 99-102, 107-9, 154-5, 163, 187-8; International Crisis Group, *"Stopping Nigeria's Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence,"* Africa Report 262, July 26, 2018; Trevor Rubenzer, "Nigeria, 1967-1970," in Karl DeRouen, Jr., and Uk Heo, eds., *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2007), pp. 567-84; Nina Shea, *"Statement on Conflicts and Killings in Nigeria's Middle Belt,"* House Foreign Affairs Committee, December 17, 2020.

Ethiopia and the Eritreans, Tigrayans, Oromos, and Somalis

Ethiopia's former Eritrean peoples live in the formerly-ruled northern region of Eritrea. In 1993, when Eritrean formally gained independence, there were about two million Eritreans, accounting for three to four percent of Ethiopia's population. The most intense conflict was fought in 1973-1992.

Ethiopia's Tigrayans live mostly in the northeastern Tigray Region. There are about seven million Tigrayans, accounting for about six percent of Ethiopia's population. The most intense fighting was in 1976-92 and from 2020 to the present.

Ethiopia's Oromos live mostly in the central Oromia Region. There are about 42 million Oromos, accounting for about 36 percent of Ethiopia's population. The most intense fighting occurred from 1977 to the present.

Ethiopia's Somalis live mostly in the eastern Somali Region. There are about eight million Ethiopian Somalis, accounting for about seven percent of Ethiopia's population. The most intense conflict was in 1993-2018.

Ethiopia and the Eritreans, Tigrayans, Oromos, and Somalis:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Ethiopia	Eritreans, Tigrayans, Oromos, and Somalis
Goals	• Sought to retain control over all Ethiopian territory • 1974-92: Imposed communist political structure and economic and cultural policies • Eritreans: New 1992 government accepted Eritrea's independence • 1992-2018: Willing to grant other ethnic groups only equal treatment under authoritarian, one-party rule • 2018-present: Willing to grant major ethnic groups regional autonomy within a federal system	• Eritreans: Sought Eritrean independence • Tigrayans: At different times, sought Tigrayan independence or dominance within Ethiopia • Oromos: Sought independence or autonomy within Ethiopia • Somalis: Sought either secession of Ogaden region from Ethiopia or autonomy within Ethiopia
Methods	• Eritreans, Tigrayans, and Oromos (1970s-1992): Total war against rebels, with rebel-area villages destroyed, rebel-held regions blockaded, and civilians killed or expelled; probably killed over 10% of Eritrea's civilian population and over 5% of Tigray's • In 1974-92, across all rebel areas taken together, killed over 150,000 civilians directly and killed far more in forced resettlement programs and government-induced famines • Oromos (1992-present): Counter-insurgency was coupled with targeted killings of suspected rebel supporters and killings of civilian protestors • Somalis (1993-2018): Counter-insurgency was coupled, not only with targeted killings of suspected rebel supporters, but also with selective destruction of rebel villages and exemplary killings of their civilians • Tigrayans (2020-present): Alongside conventional warfare, indiscriminately shelled and bombed cities and towns, conducted selective killings of civilians and a number of massacres; food blockade likely killed more than 100,000 Tigrayans; Tigrayans expelled from border regions disputed with Amhara	• Eritreans and Tigrayans (1970s-1992): Conducted guerrilla and conventional war against government security forces; generally, did not target civilians; conducted targeted killings of government personnel; attempted to funnel aid to regions they controlled while denying it to government-controlled areas • Oromos: Conducted guerrilla and conventional warfare against government security forces; sometimes targeted civilians from other ethnic groups; conducted targeted killings of government personnel • Somalis: Alongside guerrilla attacks on military targets, jihadist rebels conducted indiscriminate attacks on civilians, while nationalist rebels conducted more selective attacks on civilians • Tigrayans (2020-present): Used conventional and guerrilla warfare, indiscriminate shelling, and selective killings of civilians

	Ethiopia	Eritreans, Tigrayans, Oromos, and Somalis
Threat Level	• At first only threatened with Eritrean secession; as number and capacity of ethnic rebellions increased, threatened with loss of other major territories and even with collapse of multi-ethnic Ethiopian state; threats subsided from 1992, following Eritrea's secession, but remained; from 2020, again faced major threat of Tigray secession	• Eritreans, Tigrayans, and Oromos (1970s-1992): Apart from war, threatened with highly repressive policies that affected most Ethiopians • Oromos (1992-present): Apart from war, treated like other citizens • Tigrayans (2020-present): Prior to war, faced with loss of dominant political status within Ethiopian state

Note: Additional, similar conflicts have occurred on a smaller scale in other Ethiopian regions.

Major rebel organizations: Eritrean People's Liberation Front (Eritreans, 1973-1992); Tigray People's Liberation Front (Tigrayans, 1976-92, 2020-Present); Oromo Liberation Front (Oromos, 1977-Present); Al-Itihaad al-Islami and Ogaden National Liberation Front (Somalis, 1993-2018).

Sources: Center for Preventive Action, *"War in Ethiopia,"* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2023); Alex de Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 3-7, 10, 16, 47-8, 70, 81-90, 117, 122, 139-40, 154-5, 170-2, 188-90, 195-7, 204-5, 209, 213, 250-1, 270-2, 275-8, 313, 321-33, 347, 353-6; Alex de Waal, "The Politics of Destabilization in the Horn, 1989-2001," in Alex de Waal, ed., *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 186-9, 201-13; Global Security, *"Oromo Liberation Front,"* 2021; Tobias Hagmann, *Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The Search for an End to Conflict in the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia* (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2014), pp. 9, 13, 18-22, 23-4, 27-46, 59-64, 67-71; John Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 245-8, 253-8, 262-4, 269; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 199-209; Reuters, *"'You Don't Belong': Land Dispute Drives New Exodus in Ethiopia's Tigray."* *Reuters*, March 29, 2021.

SECTION 12: MAJOR EUROPEAN CONFLICTS: Britain and the Former Yugoslavia

Britain and the Northern Ireland Catholics

Britain's Northern Ireland Catholics live in the Northern Ireland region. In 2021, there were about 800,000 Northern Ireland Catholics, accounting for about one percent of Britain's population. The most intense conflict was in 1969-99.

Britain and the Northern Ireland Catholics:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Britain	Northern Ireland Catholics
Goals	•Maintain possession of Northern Ireland as British territory •Willing to grant regional political autonomy	•Seek secession of Northern Ireland from Britain and union with Ireland, or, from the late 1990s, Northern Ireland autonomy with the possibility of a regional independence referendum
Methods	•Conducted discriminating counter-insurgency, but failed to restrain Protestant militia attacks on Catholic civilians	•Attacked not only local police, British Army, and local civilians viewed as collaborators, but also Protestant civilians in Northern Ireland and civilian targets elsewhere in Britain
Threat Level	•Given power imbalance, no significant threat of military loss of territory	•Equal treatment within British political system

Rebel organization: Provisional Irish Republican Army.
Source: Anthony James Joes, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), pp. 119-27.

Croatia and the Croatian Serbs

Croatia

- International boundary
- County (*županija*) boundary
- ★ National capital
- ⊙ County (*županija*) center
- Railroad
- Expressway
- Road

0 — 50 Kilometers
0 — 50 Miles

Lambert Conformal Conic Projection, SP 40N/56N

County (Županija)

1. Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska	8. Krapinsko-Zagorska	15. Sisačko-Moslavačka
2. Brodsko-Posavska	9. Ličko-Senjska	16. Splitsko-Dalmatinska
3. Dubrovačko-Neretvanska	10. Međimurska	17. Varaždinska
4. Grad Zagreb (city)	11. Osječko-Baranjska	18. Virovitičko-Podravska
5. Istarska	12. Požeško-Slavonska	19. Vukovarsko-Srijemska
6. Karlovačka	13. Primorsko-Goranska	20. Zadarska
7. Koprivničko-Križevačka	14. Šibensko-Kninska	21. Zagrebačka

Base 802844AI (C00039) 11-01

Croatia's Serbs, at the time of the 1991-5 war, were regionally predominant in many places along Croatia's border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that time, there were about 250,000 Serbs in the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina, accounting for about five percent of Croatia's population.

Croatia and the Croatian Serbs:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Croatia	Croatian Serbs
Goals	•Independence from Yugoslavia on the entire territory of Yugoslavia's Croatian Republic	•Secede from Croatia and join Serbia
Methods	•Conventional warfare •Retaliatory indiscriminate shelling of contested areas •Retaliatory forced expulsions of Serbs in contested areas, with Serbs either fleeing in advance or expelled via indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings	•Conventional warfare •Indiscriminate shelling of contested areas and, sometimes, of non-contested areas •Initiated forced expulsion of Croats from claimed territories via indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings
Threat Level	•Threatened with loss of ethnic Serb regions and nearby areas linking them to cross-border Serb territories	•Faced equal treatment within Croatia

Period of most intense conflict: 1991-5.

Sources: Ivo Goldstein, *Croatia: A History* (London: Hurst, 1999), pp. 228-9, 233-6, 250, 253-4; Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 233, 245-7, 253-7, 261-8, 282, 288, 291, 294, 297-8.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (or Bosnia) and the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats

Bosnia's Serbs, at the time of the 1992-5 war, were concentrated in the Bosnia's eastern and western regions. At that time, there were about 1.4 million Serbs, accounting for about 31 percent of Bosnia's population.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats
Goals	•Independence from Yugoslavia on the entire territory of Yugoslavia's Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic •Bosnian leader Izetbegović announced long-term goal of Islamic state	•Bosnian Serbs: Secede from Bosnia and join Serbia •Bosnian Croats: Support secession of Bosnia; protect communities and political status of Croats within Bosnia; seek maximum political autonomy of Croats within Bosnia
Methods	•Bosnia: Conventional defense against Bosnian Serbs' conventional attack; indiscriminate shelling of enemy civilian areas; retaliatory forced expulsion of Serbs from Serb-held regions; initiated forced expulsion of Croats from Croat-held regions	•Bosnian Serbs: Initiated conventional warfare; initiated indiscriminate shelling of enemy civilian areas; initiated forced expulsion of Muslims and Croats from claimed territories via indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings •Bosnian Croats: Conventional warfare; retaliatory indiscriminate shelling of enemy civilian areas; retaliatory forced expulsion of Muslims from Croat-held territories via indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings
Threat Level	•Faced loss of most territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or without independence, discriminatory treatment within an enlarged Serbia	•Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats: Faced equal treatment within Bosnia, and possibly, long-term forced assimilation campaign

Period of most intense conflict: 1992-5.

Sources: *Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 129-33, 137, 140-6, 153-9, 171-83; Charles R. Shrader, *The Muslim-Croat War in Central Bosnia: A Military History,* 1992-1994 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009) pp. 70-162; Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1996), pp. 222-33, 244-8, 251, 256-7, 297, 349-50, 357-9.

Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians

Serbia's Kosovo Albanians, at the time of the 1998-9 war, were concentrated in Kosovo Autonomous Province. In 1991, there were about 1.6 million Kosovo Albanians, accounting for about 21 percent of Serbia's population.

Serbia and Kosovo Albanians:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Serbia	Kosovo Albanians
Goals	•Maintain control and eliminate traditional autonomy of Kosovo region within Serbia •Elevate Serbs within Kosovo to dominant status	•Autonomy within Serbia or, later, independence
Methods	•Conventional warfare and counter-insurgency, along with indiscriminate warfare and civilian killings •Initiated forced expulsion of Kosovo Albanians	•Guerrilla and conventional warfare; a small number of attacks on Serb civilians •Retaliatory forced expulsion of Serbs
Threat Level	•Faced possible loss of Kosovo territory	•Before war, faced discriminatory treatment within Serbia

Period of most intense conflict: 1998-9.

Rebel organization: Kosovo Liberation Army.

Source: Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "Dubious Anniversary: Kosovo One Year Later," *Cato Institute Policy Analysis 373,* June 10, 2000, pp. 3-4; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008), pp. 8-9, 49, 51, 54, 57, 66-9, 73-4.

SECTION 13: MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS OVER BORDER AREAS CLAIMED AS PARTS OF HOMELANDS:
India-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Armenia-Azerbaijan

Pakistan Compared to India

Since British India's 1947 partition into the independent states of Indian and Pakistan, India and Pakistan have fought four wars, of which three (in 1947, 1965, and 1999) have been over the disputed, mostly Kashmiri Muslim-populated, territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1989, as discussed above, Pakistan has supported a Kashmiri Muslim insurgency against India.

Pakistan and India:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Pakistan	India
Goals	•Gain control of Muslim-majority region of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for Pakistan	•Gain control of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) territory for India •Willing to allow a smaller part of J&K to remain under Pakistani control
Methods	•In 1947, 1965, and on a more limited scale in 1999, conventional invasions of J&K •In 1971, lost control of East Pakistan — what became independent Bangadesh — largely due to India's intervention on the rebels' side •Since 1988, support and eventually control over Kashmir insurgency via proxy Islamist groups; guerrilla attacks on Indian security forces; non-Muslim civilians targeted for killing and forced expulsion	•In 1947, 1965, and 1999, conventional warfare against Pakistani conventional invasions •In 1971, intervened to support successful secession of East Pakistan — what became independent Bangladesh •Since 1988, counter-insurgency against rebel groups
Threat Level	•Faced potential integration of J&K into India	•Faced potential integration of J&K into Pakistan •In event of Pakistani control of J&K, faced forced expulsion of non-Muslims •Over time, rising relative power has made Indian possession secure in controlled part of J&K

Period of most intense conflict: 1947-8, 1965, 1971, 1988-present.
Source: Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), pp. 112-38; Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 16-9, 43-5, 51-2, 61-2, 67-9, 91-5, 116-20; annual assessments of the Kashmir low-intensity conflict at the *South Asian Terrorism Portal*

Somalia Compared to Ethiopia

In 1977-8, Somalia launched and lost a war against Ethiopia to gain control over Ethiopia's western, mostly Somali-populated, Ogaden region.

Somalia and Ethiopia:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Somalia	Ethiopia
Goals	•Absorb Ethiopia's ethnic Somali-dominated Ogaden region into Somalia, including strategically important inland regions with Somali minorities	•Retain possession of Ogaden region
Methods	•Guerrilla warfare using Somalian troops and Ogaden Somali proxy militias, followed by conventional invasion of Ogaden region; indiscriminate warfare in civilian-populated areas; widespread killings and forced expulsions of Christians; prisoners of war and suspected collaborators frequently killed •After conventional defeat, low-intensity warfare targeted both security forces and civilians	•Counter-insurgency in response to guerrilla warfare, and conventional response to invasion; indiscriminate warfare in civilian-populated areas; prisoners of war and suspected collaborators frequently killed •After conventional victory, continued Somali low-intensity warfare met with counter-insurgency and destruction of villages and food sources in contested areas, expelling hundreds of thousands from their homes (many into Somalia)
Threat Level	•Somalis in Ogaden faced continued marginal status within centralized, authoritarian Ethiopian state	•Faced loss of Ogaden territory claimed by Somalia, including strategically important inland regions with Somali minorities

Period of most intense conflict: 1977-8.

Sources: Alex de Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 71-9; Gebru Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, 3 (2000), pp. 635-67.

Eritrea Compared to Ethiopia

In 1998-2000, Eritrea launched and lost a war against Ethiopia over disputed border regions.

Eritrea and Ethiopia:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Eritrea	Ethiopia
Goals	•Gain or retain control over disputed border regions mostly possessed by Ethiopia	•Retain or gain control over disputed border regions mostly possessed by Ethiopia
Methods	•Conventional invasion of disputed territory •Initiated forced expulsion of many Ethiopians from border regions seized at outset of war; retaliatory mass expulsions of Ethiopians from outside contested areas •2000-18: Supported low-intensity warfare against Ethiopia using proxy groups	•Conventional response to invasion •Initiated mass expulsions of Eritreans from outside contested areas during the war •2000-18: Conducted retaliatory strikes against Eritrea's use of proxy groups for low-intensity warfare
Threat Level	•Ethiopian control of disputed border regions	•Eritrean control of disputed border regions

Period of most intense conflict: 1998-2000.

Sources: Adrian Fontanellaz and Tom Cooper, *Ethiopian-Eritrean Wars: Volume 2, Eritrean War of Independence, 1988-1991, and Badme War, 1998-2001* (Warwick: Helion, 2018), pp. 49-66;
Human Rights Watch, "The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue," *Human Rights Watch* 15, 3(A), January 2003; Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 343-7.

Armenia (Including Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians) Compared to Azerbaijan

Beginning in 1988, under Soviet rule, and continuing, after the 1991 independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, in 1991-4 and again in 2020-1, Armenians fought to gain and retain control over Azerbaijan's southwestern, mostly Armenian-populated, Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Armenia (Including Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians) and Azerbaijan:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Armenia & Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians	Azerbaijan
Goals	• Gain or, later, retain control over predominantly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region	• Retain or, later, regain control over predominantly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region
Methods	• 1988-91: NK Armenian militias fought Soviet and Azerbaijani security forces for control over NK • 1991-1994: In conventional warfare, Armenian and NK Armenian forces took almost all of NK, along with additional large Azerbaijani territories beyond NK; Azeri civilians were expelled entirely from Armenia proper, and also from the captured territories, both in NK and beyond • 1994-2020: Intermittent border clashes • 2020: In conventional war, Armenia lost almost all territories gained in 1991-4, leaving only a smaller, encircled part of NK in Armenian hands; indiscriminately shelled Azerbaijani towns; all Armenian civilians in lost territories fled to Armenian-controlled areas	• 1988, 1990: Anti-Armenian riots, tolerated by Azerbaijani authorities, drive Armenians from Azerbaijani cities outside NK • 1988-91: NK Armenian militias fought Soviet and Azerbaijani security forces for control over NK • 1990-1: Azerbaijani and Soviet security forces expelled Armenian civilians from contested villages in and around NK • 1991-4: In conventional war, lost almost all of NK, along with additional large Azerbaijani territories beyond NK; indiscriminately shelled NK Armenian towns • 1994-2020: Intermittent border clashes • 2020: In conventional war, Azerbaijan retook almost all territories lost in 1991-4, leaving only a smaller, encircled part of NK in Armenian hands; indiscriminately shelled Armenian-populated areas in war zone
Threat Level	• Before war, threatened with Azerbaijan's continued possession of NK	• Threatened with permanent loss of NK, and later, temporary loss of territories beyond NK

Period of most intense conflict: 1988-1994, 2020-1.

Sources: Michael P. Croissant, *The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1988), pp. 28, 32, 36-42, 78-87, 92-5, 139; Thomas de Waal,
"*Unfinished Business in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict*," Carnegie Europe, February 11, 2021; Alexei Zverev, "Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus, 1988-1994," in Bruno Coppieters, ed.,
"Contested Borders in the Caucasus" (Brussels: VUB Press, 1996), Section 2.

Iraq Compared to Iran

In 1980-8, Iraq launched and lost a war against Iran. Iraq aimed to seize control over border regions and to topple or weaken Iran's Islamic Republic regime. Since before the war, and continuing during and after the war, the Islamic Republic regime sought to overthrow Iraq's regime and turn Iraq into a satellite state.

Iraq and Iran:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Iraq	Iran
Goals	•Sought regime survival •In war, sought to seize control over contested Shatt al-Arab waterway and additional border regions of Iran — including some ethnically Arab areas	•Sought revolutionary overthrow of Iraqi regime, to create a satellite state in Iraq sharing Iran's Islamist ideology •After driving out Iraqi invasion force, continued effort to overthrow the Iraqi regime and install a puppet government
Methods	•Forcibly expelled 100,000 Iraqi Shiites who collaborated, or were suspected of collaborating, with Iran's subversion efforts •Conventional invasion of Iranian border regions •Reciprocated and greatly intensified attacks on non-military targets, including indiscriminate attacks on large cities outside combat areas • Used chemical weapons to defeat Iranian conventional invasion and, on a small scale, against some civilian targets in Iran	•Used subversion and low-intensity warfare to attempt to overthrow Iraqi regime •Conventional defense against Iraqi invasion •Initiated attacks on non-military targets, including indiscriminate attacks on large cities outside combat areas •After Iraqi forces driven from Iran, conventional invasion of Iraq •Attacked international shipping and foreign oil facilities in effort to stop Iraqi oil exports
Threat Level	•Threatened with overthrow of regime and transformation of state into an Iranian satellite	•Threatened with loss of valuable border regions

Period of most intense conflict: 1988-1994, 2020-1.
Source: Efraim Karsh, *The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988* (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), pp. 9-14, 22-42, 47-61, 85

Russia Compared to Ukraine

Since 2014, and intensifying since 2022, Russia has seized border regions of Ukraine and sought to overthrow Ukraine's government and turn Ukraine into a satellite state.

Russia and Ukraine:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	Russia	Ukraine
Goals	• Gain control over large Ukrainian territories, including predominantly ethnic-Russian territory of Crimea and other, predominantly ethnic-Ukrainian regions (in the Donbas and beyond) and pursue forced cultural Russification • Turn Ukrainian state on remaining territory into a Russian-controlled satellite	• Retain control over all Ukrainian territory • Prevent Russia from turning Ukrainian state on remaining territory into a Russian-controlled satellite • Preserve distinct Ukrainian identity and culture
Methods	• Initiated conventional invasion of Ukraine, beginning in 2014 in Crimea and the Donbas, and extending in 2022 to much larger eastern, southern, and central regions • Initiated indiscriminate bombing and shelling of Ukrainian civilian areas • Often killed civilians suspected of collaborating with Ukrainian war effort • Attempted to destroy Ukrainian critical infrastructure, including electrical grid	• Conventional defense against Russian invasion; guerrilla warfare behind Russian lines • Reciprocated some indiscriminate shelling of contested areas of Donbas region
Threat Level	• No threat beyond continued Ukrainian independence within existing territorial boundaries	• Threatened with loss of large territories in Ukraine's east and south, along with de facto Russian control over remaining Ukrainian state • Threatened with long-term forced assimilation campaign in Russian-controlled areas

Period of most intense conflict: 2014-present.
Source: Institute for the Study of War. 2022-Present. "Ukraine Conflict Updates." Various dates.

China Compared to Taiwan

Since 1949, China's Communist Party regime, having won the civil war to gain control over Mainland China, has sought to gain territorial control over Taiwan. Until the 1980s, Taiwan's Nationalist Party regime in Taiwan nominally claimed to be the legitimate government of all of China. Since the 1980s, successive Taiwanese governments have shifted their goal to retaining the de facto independence enjoyed by Taiwan since 1949. So far, active fighting has been limited to the 1949-58 period.

China and Taiwan:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	China	Taiwan
Goals	• Since 1949, seeks to complete communist victory in civil war by absorbing Taiwan into China	• 1949-1980s: Sought to reverse civil war loss by reuniting all of China under its own government • 1980s-present: Seeks to retain de facto independence; most hope eventually to be internationally recognized as independent, but do not support declaring formal independence for the foreseeable future
Methods	• 1949-58: Low-intensity fighting over offshore islands and control of Taiwan Strait, as part of projected effort to invade main island of Taiwan • 1954-5, 1958: Shelled, and in some cases seized, smaller islands controlled by Taiwan • Unsuccessfully sought capability to impose control over main island	• 1949-58: Low-intensity fighting over offshore islands and control over Taiwan Strait, both to defend Taiwan to block Mainland shipping • 1954-5, 1958: Sought to defend smaller, Taiwan-controlled islands • Sought successfully to deter invasion of main island — from 1950, with China's entry into the Korean War, with U.S. assistance
Threat Level	• Faces Taiwan's continued de facto independence	• Threatened with loss of de facto independence • Threatened with losses of political and economic freedoms and of distinct Taiwanese identity

Period of most intense conflict: 1949-58.

Source: Bruce A. Elleman, *Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), pp. 20-5, 53-5, 59-65, 89-97.

North Korea Compared to South Korea

In 1950, North Korea's communist regime launched a war to absorb South Korea and unite the Korean Peninsula under its own rule. Before the 1953 cease-fire, first the United States (supported by small troop contingents from a number of allies) and then China intervened in the war. The United States sought to defeat the North Korean invasion and then to unite the Peninsula under the South Korean regime, while China supported North Korea's objectives. Since 1953, the North Korean regime has fought a low-intensity war to destabilize and overthrow the South Korean regime.

North Korea and South Korea:
Comparison of Goals, Methods, and Threat Levels

	North Korea	South Korea
Goals	•Unify Korean Peninsula under North Korean regime	•Unify Korean Peninsula under South Korean regime
Methods	•1950-3: With Soviet and Chinese assistance, launched conventional war to unify Peninsula under Northern regime; indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in South; initiated mass killing of civilians suspected of supporting Southern regime •1953-Present: Periodic low-intensity attacks on military and civilian targets	•1950-3: With U.S. assistance, after repelling conventional invasion, invaded North to unify Peninsula under Southern regime; area bombing of strategic targets, largely indiscriminate, in heavily populated areas in North, similar to that conducted against Germany and Japan in World War II; retaliatory mass killing of civilians suspected of supporting Northern regime •1953-Present: Defense against periodic low-intensity attacks on Southern military and civilian targets
Threat Level	•Threatened with integration into South Korean state —particularly in later phases of Korean War and since Soviet Union's collapse	•Threatened with integration into North Korean state, including draconian repression characteristic of Northern rule — although the threat has declined significantly as South Korean relative power has grown over time

Period of most intense conflict: 1950-3.

Source: Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 81, 90-3, 112-3, 169, 235-7, 267-9.

SECTION 15: CONCLUSIONS

Israel Compares Well to All Other Countries

Israel's moderate goals and methods and the seriousness of the threat she faces contrast strongly with her enemies' extreme goals and methods and the limited threats they face. There is no greater asymmetry among the dozens of internal and international ethno-territorial conflicts in the world.

Israel should be compared to all other states embroiled in ethno-territorial conflicts. There is no state showing comparable moderation that faces a comparable threat.

Other states having comparably moderate goals and methods, such as India, Britain, Ukraine, and Taiwan, do not face the threat of annihilation of both state and people.

It is difficult to imagine any other state showing similar, let alone greater, moderation under comparable levels of threat.

Israel has made more far-reaching peace offers than most other states holding disputed territories. These included an offer of a Palestinian state in all of Gaza and over 90% of the West Bank.

Though Palestinian Arab leadership have so far refused to negotiate a final peace agreement, Israel accepted a separate Palestinian Authority that forms the basis of a future Palestinian state. From 1993 to 2005, Israel withdrew from the major West Bank population centers and all of Gaza.

Israel, to solidify claims to the limited range of disputed territories that Israel is less willing to give up in a future peace agreement, has relied on in-migration of its own population. Israel has also unilaterally dismantled all settlements in Gaza and some in the West Bank as part of an effort to separate from a projected future Palestinian Arab state.

Israel's efforts to minimize civilian casualties in responding to Palestinian Arab and other enemy attacks and threats are similar or superior to the best practices of other democracies.

The Palestinian Arabs and their radical supporters do not accept Jewish statehood in any form, regardless of its territorial size. They target Israel's entire Jewish population for killing and expulsion.

Their supposed peace offers take two forms, both of which are thinly disguised plans to destroy Israel. One is a "binational" state in which Jews would be a minority—predictably leading to a Palestinian-controlled state that would harass, kill, and expel its Jewish population. Another combines Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders with in-migration into Israel of millions of descendants of Palestinian refugees, producing the same outcome as the "binational" state.

This extremism persists despite Israel's longstanding desire to coexist with Arab states, including a potential Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel's equal treatment of its own Arab Muslim citizens.

What about Israel's state enemies, such as *Turkey*, *Iraq*, and *Iran* What would these states have done in Israel's situation? It is not hard to imagine, based on what they have done when facing far lesser threats.

Governments of other majority-Muslim countries, such as *Pakistan*, *Bangladesh*, and *Indonesia* have usually supported the war to destroy Israel. What would these states have done in Israel's situation? Again, it is not hard to imagine, based upon their own records.

Even the most moderate states would predictably have employed far less moderate means had they been threatened in ways similar to Israel. For example, Britain and the U.S. fought total wars — including area bombing of cities — when they faced dangerous enemies in World War II and *Korea*.

The Worst, Most Lethal Kind of Anti-Semitism

The double-standards applied to Israel are not just discriminatory. They are genocidal — part of the continuing effort, not only to deny Jews' right to national self-determination, but to destroy Israel and eliminate her Jewish population.

The IHRA definition of anti-semitism includes these two elements:
1. "Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
2. "Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation."

Israel is singled out for the most extreme criticism from among all other states, including many democratic ones, engaged in ethno-territorial conflicts. This fits the IHRA double-standard criterion.

But this double-standard is not merely anti-semitic. It is part of the larger effort to destroy Israel and eliminate her Jewish population — a genocidal form of anti-semitism.

Israel's more extreme critics take part in the effort to destroy the Jewish state and eliminate its Jewish population. They do not just unfairly single out Israel or deny Jews' right to self-determination. They unreasonably attack almost all of Israel's self-defense efforts, so as to justify sanctions designed to destroy her economy and capacity for self-defense. They join Israel's enemies in seeking her destruction.

Legal definitions of genocide focus on the intent to destroy a group, in whole or in part. Ordinary language usage often also requires that there must be a serious threat to actually do so. Both definitions are met in Israel's case.

Across the world's many ethno-territorial conflicts, no other state and people is targeted ideologically in such a biased way—because no other state and people is threatened in this way.

Israel must be judged fairly, according to standards that are applied equally to all states that have been engaged in ethno-territorial conflicts.

Consider the dozens of other examples of ethno-territorial conflict. Why is it so rare that anyone knows or cares about any of them? Because only Israel faces such a powerful coalition of enemies committed to destroy her.

Applying double-standards against Israel as part of the larger effort to destroy the Jewish state and her Jewish population is anti-semitism of the most lethal kind.

The threats to Israel are also threats to the Jewish people globally. If Israel has no right to exist or to defend herself, then Jews inevitably become targets. When double-standards single out Israel as part of the effort to annihilate her, Jews are not safe.

Many people have been deceived by the double-standards. If they are informed, most will support Israel's right to exist and to defend herself.

Reasons for Optimism: The Strengths of Israel and the Jewish People

Israel has faced a daunting array of security threats. These threats have been met with remarkable success. The threats continue, but Israel and its supporters abroad have the strength and will to meet them.

The security threats to Israel and the Jewish people take five main forms: military, economic, demographic, diplomatic, and ideological.

Military threats: The conventional, guerrilla, and terror threats have become less dangerous and more manageable over time—although missile threats are potentially grave, and conventional military threats may reemerge. Currently, the Iranian nuclear threat is the most dangerous threat, and the one most likely to escalate to full-scale war.

Economic threats: Israel's economy has thrived and continues to do so. Israel has become a rich country, with living standards comparable to Italy (based on purchasing power) or Germany (based on exchange rates). Israel's high-tech achievements are unparalleled for a country of its size. The closest analogues are Taiwan and South Korea. But Taiwan's high-tech strengths are narrower. South Korea's are more comparable, but its population is about five times larger. The main economic threat to Israel comes via the United Nations Security Council and the international BDS campaign. The discriminatory slandering of Israel seeks to justify economic sanctions that would cripple Israel's economy and defense capabilities.

Demographic security: Among rich countries, Israel has by far the highest birthrate and the youngest population. To remain the homeland of the Jewish people, Israel must retain a secure Jewish majority. As of 2022, the birth rate of Israel's Jewish population has surpassed that of its Muslim population, even as substantial net immigration of Jews continues from other parts of the world.

Diplomatic threats: The major diplomatic threats are economic boycotts and sanctions. In the past, these have been limited largely by U.S. support. U.S. federal and state laws prohibiting discriminatory anti-Israel boycotts are unlikely to change. The main threat emanates from the UN Security Council. It is unlikely, but possible, that an anti-Israel president could be elected in the U.S., who would no longer oppose resolutions imposing economic sanctions on Israel. Then it would be left to the governments of other veto powers that have sometimes been friendly to Israel to block or water down the resolutions. But these states may at the same time also have governments unfriendly to Israel. Continuing outreach to developing countries with friendly governments—such as India—is also vital. But it is unlikely that a sufficiently large number of temporary members of the UN Security Council will vote to block sanctions against Israel.

Ideological threats: The long-term source of the diplomatic threat—determining whether it grows or subsides—is the ideological threat. The main ideological threat is the BDS campaign and its supporters. The most important fronts for this threat are in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Thus, after the nuclear threat, and probably on a similar level to other major potential military threats, the ideological threat is one of the most important facing Israel. That is also where supporters of Israel can have the biggest impact—by educating themselves and others and supporting and working with like-minded organizations.

Based on Israel's actual record compared to all other states in similar conflicts — an unparalleled record of moderation under existential threat—there is a powerful factual and moral appeal to be made to American and international public opinion. Part of that appeal should be branding Israel's ideological enemies for what they are—the worst, most lethal kind of anti-semites.

We have only to raise our voices to make the case against those who seek to destroy Israel and the Jewish people.

There are many fine information outlets and political outreach organizations! Supporters of Israel should seek knowledge, friendship, and community by learning from them, supporting them, and joining their efforts!

Fighting Back against Israel's Enemies: Ideas and Organizations

IDEAS: HISTORY AND CURRENT EVENTS

The Algemeiner: Israel; U.S. and world Jewry; anti-semitism; Yiddish culture

Commentary (magazine, website, podcast): general politics, with extensive coverage of Israel and the Middle East

Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (website): journalism on Israel and the Middle East

Dershow Podcast (Alan Dershowitz): general politics, with extensive coverage of Israel and anti-semitism

Facts and Logic about the Middle East (website and information outreach): Israel and the Middle East

Foundation for Defense of Democracies (website, podcasts): general international affairs, with extensive coverage of Israel and the Middle East

Free Press, (website) *Honestly* (podcast): general news, with extensive coverage of Israel and anti-semitism, founded by Bari Weiss

High Level Military Group (website): Israel's comparative performative in complying with the laws of war, including the Gaza conflicts with Hamas

International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (website): international organization with 35 member countries

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (website): Israel and the Middle East

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (website): Israel and the Middle East

Jewish News Syndicate (website)

Jewish Virtual Library (website, app): Judaism, Jewish history, and Israel

Middle East Forum (website, podcasts): Israel, the Middle East, and Islamism in the U.S. and around the world

Middle East Quarterly (journal/magazine): Israel and the Middle East

Middle East Media Research Institute (website): Palestinian and Middle Eastern leadership and media in translation

New York Post (newspaper, website): general news, with extensive coverage of Israel and anti-semitism

UN Watch: Israel and anti-semitism at the United Nations

Wall Street Journal (newspaper—subscription required): general politics, with good coverage of Israel and anti-semitism

Washington Institute for Near East Policy (website): Israel and the Middle East

POLITICAL OUTREACH

Amcha Initiative: anti-semitism in universities

American Jewish Committee: anti-semitism, Israel, worldwide Jewish communities

American Jewish Congress: anti-semitism, Israel, worldwide Jewish communities

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): Israel

Anti-Defamation League: anti-semitism

Christians United for Israel: general international affairs, with extensive coverage of Israel and the Middle East

Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations: anti-semitism, Israel, worldwide Jewish communities

End Jew Hatred

Friends of Israel Initiative

Honest Reporting: Journalism on Israel

Jewish Institute for National Security in America: Israel's military security

Scholars for Peace in the Middle East: Israel, anti-semitism

StandWithUs: Israel, anti-semitism

World Zionist Organization: Israel, anti-semitism

Zionist Organization of America: Israel, anti-semitism

Author: Shale Horowitz is a professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. His current _research_ examines ethno-territorial conflict and Chinese politics and foreign policy. A much-shorter version of this booklet appeared in the _Middle East Quarterly_.